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1. Introduction 
 
In order to build government structures and activities more around the fundamental needs 
of individuals and to achieve more effective social outcomes for New Zealanders, how 
can cross-government information sharing be improved, taking into account fundamental 
rights like the privacy protection of individuals? What can be learned from other 
jurisdictions in that respect? These questions have been examined in a project 
commissioned by Public Service Chief Executives under the Emerging Issues Programme 
(EIP) based on a partnership between VUW’s School of Government and the Public 
Service. The project was coordinated by Dr Miriam Lips, Professor of e-Government at 
VUW. The research took place from September 2008 until October 2009.  
 
Focus of the research 
Transforming service design with a primary objective to achieve effective social outcomes 
is one of the key challenges for public management in the 21st Century. Vulnerable 
individuals and families dependent on welfare support (i.e. individuals and families at 
risk, such as long-term unemployed, homeless, refugees, youth offenders) often are facing 
complex problems with interrelated, underlying causes located in various policy domains, 
such as unemployment, education, health, housing, and justice. Traditionally, it is 
expected that these individuals join up the existing structures of government in a way that 
the complexity of their problems can be met. By taking a more holistic viewpoint of 
individuals’ needs however, increased effectiveness of public service provision can be 
achieved by building government support around those interrelated needs of the 
individual or family at risk. Using an integrated service response approach of ‘no wrong 
door’, the New Zealand Ministry of Social Development together with several 
government and non-government organisations, already is working towards transformed 
public service design in order to achieve more effective social outcomes.  
 
To support this paradigm shift of organisation-centric to citizen-centric government, 
improving information sharing across government is essential and Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) are therefore critical infrastructure of 21st Century 
government. Internationally however we can observe that the introduction and use of 
ICTs can have a huge and varying impact on the ways in which personal information of 
individuals or families is handled across the public sector, ranging from increased levels 
of information security to increased risks of large-scale data breaches. With substantial, 
ICT-enabled changes to public service design being considered, including increasing 
information sharing across government, emerging tensions around the safeguarding of 
fundamental citizens’ rights, such as privacy and confidentiality, need to be taken into 
account (Bellamy et al. 2005; 6 et al. 2005).  
 
Countries with similar jurisdictions to New Zealand, such as the UK, Canada and 
Australia, are developing strategies to overcome these tensions between goals of service 
transformation and the privacy protection of individuals, with a current focus on allowing 
specific information sharing arrangements for targeted user groups, such as children or the 
most disadvantaged in society, and developing cross-government Identity Management 
(IDM) solutions. Some overseas policy makers even seem to believe that privacy 
legislation is standing in the way of progress towards improved information sharing that 
will support the transformation of public service provision. On the other hand, on the 
basis of an independent review of the UK Data Protecton Act and policy relating to data 
sharing in the UK, Thomas & Walport come to the conclusion that,  “in the vast majority 
of cases, the law itself does not provide a barrier to the sharing of personal data. 
However, the complexity of the law, amplified by a plethora of guidance, leaves those who 
may wish to share data in a fog of confusion” (Thomas & Walport 2008, p.i).  
3  
Nationally and internationally so far however, there is a lack of empirical research on 
information sharing practices of government agencies, including the role and 
implementation of privacy legislation. Consequently, the focus of this research was to 
empirically examine information sharing practices between agencies in New Zealand, and 
more specifically in areas where public officials are dealing with multiple, fundamental 
problems from the viewpoint of the individual or family, such as combined problems of 
unemployment, poor education, health, housing, and crime. Usually, these complex 
problems are at the interface of various policy domains (e.g. social, economic and justice) 
and multiple government and other organisations (e.g. Ministry of Social Development, 
NZ Police, Probations, Health, Refugees’ services organisation, Auckland City Council). 
This project has been further scoped to empirically explore case studies of individuals and 
families at risk (or imminent risk). 
 
 
Key objectives and research design 
The objective of this project was to identify opportunities for improved information 
sharing across the NZ government in order to achieve more effective social outcomes, 
without compromising fundamental rights of individuals, such as privacy protection and 
confidentiality.  
 
In order to achieve that objective the research first needed to empirically explore to what 
extent and how personal information related to complex, multiple needs of individuals or 
families in the wider social policy area (including health, education and justice) is 
collected, managed, and shared in a variety of joint service arrangements across 
government and other organisations involved. This research activity involved qualitative 
research including a wide variety of case studies. Secondly, in order to identify potential 
learning opportunities for improved information sharing from jurisdictions overseas, a 
document study was conducted of existing strategies and arrangements for cross-
government information sharing in the UK, Canada and Australia. Research findings from 
both activities have been discussed and further developed in three solutions-oriented focus 
group meetings with front line staff members, middle managers and other experts in the 
area of cross-government information sharing, and in feedback sessions with research 
participants.  
 
The research project focused on the following questions: 
 
To what extent and how is personal information of individuals with complex social 
needs collected, managed, and shared across government and other organisations? 
 
What are barriers and enablers to cross-government information sharing?  
 
What are existing strategies and arrangements for enabling cross-government 
information sharing in other jurisdictions? What can New Zealand learn from other 
jurisdictions in that respect? 
 
How, and under what conditions, can cross-government information sharing be 
improved in order to achieve more effective social outcomes?  
 
 
Furthermore, a reference group was established for this research project, which included 
representatives of stakeholder organisations, such as the Ministry of Social Development, 
Ministry of Justice, NZ Police, Department of Corrections, Ministry of Women’s Affairs, 
State Services Commission, Treasury, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner and the 
Office of the Ombudsmen. 
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Overview of this report 
First of all, in chapter 2 of this report, we present an overview of available academic 
literature in the field of cross-agency collaboration and information sharing, with a 
specific focus on New Zealand-based research. We used this literature review to develop a 
theoretical lens on the basis of which we explored our empirical research object. In 
chapter 3, we describe the research design of this project, including the research 
methodology and criteria used for the selection of case studies. The case study findings 
are presented in chapter 4; this chapter is organised around five different cross-agency 
initiatives that were selected for the research. Several of these included more than one 
location, making up the eight cases included overall in the research.  
 
A cross-case study analysis of the research findings is provided in chapter 5. In chapter 6, 
we report on information sharing approaches and solutions adopted in the United 
Kingdom, Canada and Australia, and briefly point out the main differences compared to 
the New Zealand research findings. And finally in chapter 7, based on the research 
findings, we present solutions and recommendations for improving information sharing to 
establish effective social outcomes in New Zealand. 
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2. Available literature on cross-agency collaboration and 
information sharing 
 
Information sharing across public sector organisations and their NGO partners takes place 
in a public management context involving people from multiple government and non-
government organisations. Horizontal arrangements between different organisations are 
referred to as ‘networks’ in the scholarly literature. Networks are often juxtaposed to 
hierarchies, and markets, although many researchers point out that it is not a case of 
‘either – or’, but ‘and’. Horizontal approaches to improve the delivery of public services 
have been referred to as ‘joined-up government’. Thus this chapter briefly summarises the 
scholarly literature on networks and joined-up government canvassed in an earlier review  
(Eppel 2007) and with a specific focus on New Zealand-based research. Furthermore, this 
chapter seeks to integrate other scholarly research, particularly where information sharing 
and processing of personal information on the citizen is at the heart of the joined-up 
effort. At the end of this chapter, a brief overview is provided of the specific legal context 
for cross-agency information sharing in New Zealand, the Privacy Act, 1993. 
 
Joined-up government 
The idea of ‘joined-up government (JUG; also called ‘collaborative’ or ‘integrated’ 
government) has been practiced and researched within a number of international 
jurisdictions including the UK, Netherlands, USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, 
as a response to fragmented and non citizen-focused delivery of public services.  
 
In a New Zealand-based research project conducted under the Emerging Issues 
Programme in 2007 and 2008, seven examples of joined-up government were investigated 
(Eppel et al. 2008). The findings from this project have been analysed in comparison with 
available international research findings about: when and why joining-up across 
government is a good idea; how joining up happens – what helps and hinders joining-up. 
These are summarised in turn in the following sections. 
 
Why and when to join-up 
In many cases, joining-up across organisations is a response to two problems. The first 
problem is a structural one relating to the bounded focus of each organisation and the 
tendency for government services in New Zealand and elsewhere under what has been 
branded ‘New Public Management’ to be delivered by single focus organisations or 
contracted, third-party organisations (6 2004).  
 
The second problem is that, as citizen needs for services become more complex, the 
services they require are likely to be spread across the ambit of a number of government 
agencies. The more fragmented and multi-causal the issues faced by citizens, then the 
more difficult it is for any government agency, or service delivery organisation, to 
understand the problem, and deliver appropriate, high quality services focused on the 
client’s needs. 
 
The efforts of government agencies to work together can result in a continuum of degrees 
of joined-up government summarised in Figure 1. They can range from informal, ad-hoc 
arrangements and information exchanges, to formalised, shared working initiatives on 
integrated service delivery. 
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Figure 1 Continuum of inter-agency integration 
 
There is no right answer to the question what is the appropriate level of joining-up (6 
2004). Working across different agencies and joining-up is not easy, and takes time and 
additional effort by the individuals and agencies involved. However when the issues being 
dealt with are complex, fragmented and multi-causal, then it is more likely that no one 
agency has sufficient information or resources to address the issues alone (Conklin 2006; 
Ritter & Webber 1973). A general rule is that the complexity of the public management 
response needs to match the complexity of the problem. That is, the more the clients’ 
needs are complex and need to be addressed by multiple agencies, the more government 
agencies need to move towards the collaborative end of the continuum to address their 
information and resource deficiencies (Bryson et al. 2006; Klijn 1997). 
 
The New Zealand research identified two critical factors that influenced a decision by 
agencies to join-up in a more collaborative, problem sharing and problem solving way. 
The first is a so-called “ah-ha moment”: the recognition by one or more people that the 
issue, or problem, cannot be dealt with in the normal way – that the agencies’ usual way 
of doing business and standard procedures are inadequate for the circumstances.  
 
The second critical factor identified in the research is a trio of roles with particular 
characteristics: the roles of the so-called ‘public entrepreneur’, ‘fellow-travellers’ and 
‘guardian angels’. These roles are not limited to a single person but all three of these roles 
are necessary to take a ‘ah-ha’ moment and turn the handling of an issue into a successful 
inter-agency collaboration. 
 
The ‘public entrepreneur’ is the individual(s) who takes that moment of recognition that 
an issue ‘doesn’t make sense’ or ‘this does not fit within our standard ways of working’ or 
‘we don’t have enough information or resources to deal with this issue’ and begins to seek 
out other people – ‘fellow travellers’ – like-minded people in other agencies who might 
have a part of the information needed to understand the issue and find a solution.  
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Most incipient collaborations of this sort will not come to much, unless there are so-
called  ‘guardian angels’, that is, people who can act as critical friends, mentors or 
protectors, to allow a new way of working to develop.  
 
Ways to join up 
The style and specifics of interagency working are highly contingent on the specific 
context, issues to be solved, and the people involved; however, the literature does offer 
some guidance about what needs to happen to support cross-agency working. First of 
all, because of the fragmented and difficult to define nature of some public 
management problems, and the existence of many perspectives on their causes and 
solutions, a culture of learning is needed. This includes learning from the perspective 
and experiences of others, as well as learning by doing. Complex problems do not lend 
themselves to simple solutions. However, they can be addressed by an iterative process 
of assessment, learning, acting, re-assessment, learning and further action. 
 
Joining-up goes through a series of phases following the ‘ah-ha’ moment that acts as 
the trigger for doing things differently. The New Zealand research characterised these 
phases as ‘before starting’, ‘getting together’, ‘working together’, and ‘sustaining’ (see 
Figure 2). It also noted the importance of the culture of leaning from others and 
learning from doing, and the need for support from ‘home’ organisations for the 
collaborative processes. 
 
 
 
 
      Figure 2 Phases of Joining-up 
 
Joining-up and information sharing between organisations is affected by the context 
in which it takes place (Bryson et al. 2006; Crosby & Bryson 2005; Eppel et al. 2008; 
Ryan et al. 2008). The following contexts are relevant:  
 
 public sector context; 
 political context; 
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 organisational context; and 
 community context 
 
The public sector context implies that attention must be paid to the ‘authorising 
environment’ which influences what services need to be delivered and how they are 
delivered (Moore 1995). 
 
The political context is part of the authorising environment. The management of 
public policy problems and delivery of public services cannot be completely at 
variance with political priorities and directions. The New Zealand research examples 
suggest that some activity remains ‘beneath the radar’ because of uncertainty about 
political acceptability and authorisation. In these circumstances the role of ‘guardian 
angels’ becomes critically important in creating alignment between the joined-up 
activity and political context. 
 
According to 6 et al. (2006), the nature and form of the organisations involved in 
joining-up affects the nature and form of the collaboration. Strong hierarchical 
organisations are likely to be more rule-bound, procedurally wedded to their 
organisational ways of working. They are more likely to be intolerant of 
entrepreneurial ways of working which are independent of formal position of the 
individuals involved.  
 
The community context will also affect the nature of the collaboration and the extent 
to which people in the community of clients can be involved in the horizontal 
processes of problem identification and problem solution. Bearing in mind that no 
one organisation has sufficient information or resources to address issues alone, 
community and client perspectives could be vital to ensuring the right services are 
available and that service quality is fitted to needs. 
 
Working together 
Agranoff and McGuire (2001) posit that there is a set of management behaviours and 
responsibilities associated with horizontal network management different from and 
parallel to the traditionally acknowledged ‘POSDCORB’ framework (i.e. Planning, 
Organising, Staffing, Directing, Co-ordinating, Reporting, Budgeting) (Gulick & 
Urwick 1937). These behaviours and responsibilities include: 
 ‘activation’ – identifying participants in the network and tapping their skills, 
knowledge and resources: network managers arrange, stabilise as much as 
possible, nurture and integrate the network structure; 
 ‘framing’ – occurs during formation and operation of the network and 
involves establishing and influencing the operating rules of the network, 
influencing its prevailing values and norms, and altering the perceptions of 
the network participants; 
 ‘mobilising’ – requires a view of the strategic whole: network managers must 
induce individuals to make a commitment to the joint undertaking and to 
keep that commitment; they must mobilise organisations and forge 
agreement on the role and scope of network operations, which involves 
motivating, inspiring and inducing commitment; and 
 ‘synthesising’ – creating the environment and enhancing conditions for 
favourable, productive interaction: network managers must find a way to 
blend the various participants, each with conflicting goals or different 
perceptions or dissimilar values, to fulfil the strategic purpose of the network 
(Mandell 1999).  
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Network leadership 
In a horizontal, inter-organisational network the key behaviours and responsibilities 
fall on the collaborative group of individuals; each group must arrive at an 
accommodation for how these responsibilities will be shared. This has implications 
for the leadership appropriate in these networks. Huxham & Vangen (2000) refer to 
this as the shaping and implementing of collaborative agendas, which is affected by 
the network structure and its member organisations. Depending on the structure of 
the network, some leadership may come from outside of the formal membership of 
the network, e.g. the CEO of one of the member organisations.  
 
Networks are in effect a type of loosely coupled organisation, different from the 
traditional vertical organisation and they require different leadership skills. Mandell 
(1999), Kickert et al. (1997); Agranoff & McGuire (2001) all stress that managing in 
inter-organisational arrangements is different from the vertical and horizontal 
management that goes on in organisations.  
 
Different skills and knowledge are needed for cross-agency collaboration. Compared 
with the conventional hierarchical organisation there is no central authority; 
therefore, facilitative leadership, rather than one based on command and control, is 
needed. The focus is on selecting appropriate actors and resources, shaping the 
operating context and developing ways to cope with the strategic and operational 
complexity (Agranoff & McGuire 1999). Rather than controlling, the focus needs to 
be on co-ordinating the strategies of actors with different goals and preferences with 
regard to a certain problem or policy measures, within an existing network of inter-
organisational relations (Kickert, et al. 1997, pp. 10-11). Crosby & Bryson (2005) 
conclude that the ‘potential for effective leadership lies alike with those who do and 
do not have formal positions of power and authority’ and power and influence remain 
concentrated in certain ‘nodes’ of leadership who lead ‘up and out rather than down’. 
 
Many scholars have identified the achievement of goal consensus and trust as 
essential outcomes of effective leadership for working together across organisations. 
Hudson (2004) says that the effective operation of a network requires that its 
different participants are clear about the roles and responsibilities to be undertaken by 
themselves and other members. This will be affected by the extent to which network 
members have an understanding of their inter-dependence which is the fundamental 
basis for their collaborative problem-solving efforts. 
 
Goal consensus 
Achieving goal consensus is not the same as doing everything together and agreeing 
on everything. But it does mean achieving broad agreement on the overall outcome 
the horizontal group is trying to achieve. This type of consensus is more likely where 
organisations have similar goals. Relationships among organisations that may have 
similarities but operate in different sectors can be intense and stable in nature. In 
contrast, where organisations of the same kind are producing the same product or 
service, relationships are predicted to be fragile and insecure, and domain consensus 
can be predicted to be difficult to achieve (Hudson 2004). 
 
Hudson (2004) also notes that there are two levels of ties that may link partners 
together: ties at an institutional (or policy) level usually conceptualised as 
organisational forms; and ties at a more micro-analytic, transactional level (provider 
networks). Together they form a basis for thinking about the nature of ‘whole 
systems’ working that is urged upon service commissioners and providers. The 
literature on inter-organisational networking has tended to conceptualize the ties 
linking organisations at the rather aggregate level of organizational forms. What is 
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now needed, says Hudson, is a better understanding of some lower-level ties – the 
characteristics, intentions, aspirations or situation of participating actors – at the level 
of provider networks. This was also confirmed by the New Zealand study which 
identified the need for linkages at the top/policy level of the organisations and at the 
service delivery/front line, but also in the middle to help forge consistent ways of 
supporting the collaboration across the organisations involved. 
 
Hudson (2004) and the New Zealand study (Eppel et al. 2008) both emphasise the 
dynamic nature of the inter-organisational relationship and the policy problems they 
are addressing. It is a dynamic framework capable of capturing change, and one that 
makes no assumptions about a specific plan, network ‘cycle’ or journey. Evaluation, 
review, learning and reassessment need to be part of a continuous process undertaken 
within the horizontal ‘organisation’ and with support and interaction from the vertical 
organisations involved.  
 
Trust 
A critical ingredient of successful cross-agency working identified by nearly all 
studies is trust. Perri 6 et al. (2006) provide an extensive discussion of the concept of 
trust between organisations. They offer the idea of trust being linked to a task: for 
example, an organisation’s statistics might be trusted while some other aspect of their 
performance, such as follow through on complaints, might not. Trust relates to the 
expectations of others. It can also be seen as linked to the willingness to play 
according to accepted rules. 
 
Rommel and Christiaens (2009) point out that by co-ordinating the actions of actors, 
trust allows actors to co-operate. High trust is assumed to result in a deeper form of 
collaborative behaviour between partners. Partners that trust each other will engage in 
increased information-sharing, especially the sharing of tacit information (Edelenbos 
& Klijn 2007). They will also share strategically important information and 
competencies, allowing the partner to learn and to innovate. Furthermore, partners 
will engage in joint problem-solving and joint action (Dyer & Chu 2003; Muthusamy 
& White 2005). High trust will reduce the need for control, so that transaction costs 
and the need for formal contracting are reduced (Ring & Van de Ven 1992; Das & 
Teng 2001). 
 
Hudson (2004) summarises the benefits for inter-organisational working and 
outcomes arising from trust. Sharing of values characteristic of trust promotes several 
kinds of social processes leading to the development of ‘synergistic team 
relationships’ in an organisational setting and, with that, to superior performance. 
These include: 
 
Broad role definitions:  
How broadly or narrowly individuals define their work roles has been shown to 
influence co-operative behaviours. When conditional trust exists, individuals 
define their roles in accordance with expected job behaviours and assigned 
duties; with unconditional trust, the interactions are likely to lead individuals to 
define their roles more broadly. 
 
Communal relationships:  
The shared values underlying unconditional trust guide people to strive for 
communal relationships characterized by helpfulness and responsibility, and to 
contribute to the development of such relationships. Communal relationships, in 
turn, are likely to promote inter-personal co-operation and teamwork. 
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High confidence in others:  
The shared values that underlie unconditional trust provide individuals with 
the high degree of confidence in each other necessary for synergistic team 
relationships to emerge, because one can be assured of others’ ultimate 
intentions and objectives.  
 
Help-seeking behaviour:  
Seeking help is not threatening under unconditional trust because inter-
dependence is seen as a positive force, and shared values and positive attitudes 
ensure against attributions of inadequacy. 
 
Free exchange of knowledge and information:  
Knowledge and information are not likely to be exchanged freely when one 
party cannot be sure about the moral basis of another party’s actions or the 
values that are prospectively guiding that party’s behaviour. However, with 
unconditional trust, the underpinning shared values provide individuals with 
the assurance that knowledge and information will be used for the wider good.  
 
 
What hinders joining-up 
The previous sections have identified what is needed to make horizontal, inter-
organisations ways of working successful. Conversely failure to have regard to 
these matters will place the arrangement at risk. The New Zealand joined-up 
government research findings suggest that sustaining a cross-agency way of 
working requires support and understanding of the practicalities encountered when 
working horizontally as well as of the importance of developing accountability and 
review processes suited to this way of working. Such arrangements most often fail 
or cease to work effectively because home organisations withdraw their support or 
because one organisation imposes its organisational requirements on the inter-
organisational arrangement.  
 
 
Information sharing across organisations 
Increasingly, in many countries around the world, improving cross-agency 
information sharing to enhance the quality of public services to individuals, 
especially those at risk, such as children, the sick and elderly, homeless, youth 
criminals, long-term unemployed, refugees and others with high and complex 
needs is at the heart of public management reform efforts (e.g. 6 et al. 2005; 
Varney 2006). Often, these reform efforts are further supported by the publication 
of model information-sharing protocols designed to promote increased sharing of 
client information across agencies, and the roll-out of ICT infrastructures and 
systems to promote cross-agency information sharing (e.g. Bellamy et al. 2008).  
 
More in general, the capabilities of ICTs to facilitate cross-agency information 
sharing and integrate public sector information in networked environments have 
been widely acknowledged. Perceived benefits are increased productivity, 
improved decision making, the reduction of administrative burden (e.g. 
duplication), better law enforcement, higher information quality (resulting in fewer 
mistakes), and integrated services (Gil-Garcia et al. 2009, p.1). However, cross-
agency information sharing and integration is also perceived as a difficult and 
complex activity, with important barriers in technical (e.g. incompatibility of 
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hardware and software, data incompatibility), organisational (e.g. diversity in 
organisational cultures, conflicting organisational priorities, lack of funding), 
political (e.g. lack of political support), and legal domains (e.g. restrictive laws and 
regulations) (Gil-Garcia et al. 2009, p.3–4). 
 
So far however, there is not much empirical research available on how various 
government and non-government agencies are handling the sharing of clients’ personal 
details in the establishment of cross-agency collaborations. Available research findings 
in this area indicate that there are many cases where information is still not shared 
when it should be, or where it is shared when it should not be (Bellamy et al. 2008, 
p.737). In the last decade, these research findings usually have been confirmed by 
dedicated research into information sharing practices around terrorist attacks and the 
protection of national or homeland security, leading to scholarly observations that, in 
many countries, policy discussions about the collection and sharing of personal 
information across agencies, as well as resulting actions around and regulations of 
information privacy, have taken on a different character (e.g. Regan 2004; Roberts 
2004; Gellman 2004). Similarly, other recent societal ‘crises’ involving cross-agency 
information sharing, such as Hurricane Katrina in the USA or the Victoria Climbie 
murder case in the UK, appear to have opened up policy discussions around the 
information sharing failings of government agencies and urged for substantial changes 
to existing institutional arrangements, such as the creation of new legislation, changes 
to governance structures and leadership of government agencies, and the introduction 
of new information systems (e.g. Wetmore 2007; Bertot & Jaeger 2007; Peckover et al. 
2008). 
 
Gellman (2004) points at the phenomenon of ‘mission creep’ as a potential outcome of 
the introduction of new personal information systems: the development of secondary or 
tertiary uses of these systems far beyond their original purpose. As an example, 
Gellman raises the mission creep of the Social Security Number (SSN) in the USA, 
which started life in the 1930s with a simple purpose expressly unrelated to 
identification, and eventually became an all-purpose identification number, with dozens 
of legally authorised uses, and an untold number of unregulated uses (Gellman 2004, p. 
499). Gellman also points at the potential development of ‘database derivative 
activities’: activities ancillary to the original purpose for which a database of personal 
information was compiled. These ancillary activities occur within the same plane as the 
original purpose as direct extensions or derivatives of that purpose undertaken by the 
operator of the database or by somebody else (Gellman 2004, p. 500). For example, in 
the USA, the history of the credit reporting system demonstrates a large variety of 
derivative activities, such as instant credit support, identity theft and identity theft 
assurance, credit watch services, and credit scoring and rescoring (Ibid). 
 
One of the few empirical research projects on cross-agency information sharing 
reported in the literature looked at eight multi-agency arrangements in the UK, situated 
within policy domains of integrated health and social care, crime reduction, and public 
protection, in which personal information of individuals at risk is being shared 
(Bellamy et al. 2008; Bellamy et al. 2007) The research findings demonstrate that 
consistency of information sharing is dependent on how discretion is exercised in the 
street-level management of individual cases. As information sharing decisions often 
need to be taken in the absence of decision rules that would be obvious and acceptable 
to all interested parties, professional workers face continual dilemmas between the risk 
of ‘false negative’ error judgements (i.e. when no action is taken, but where it turns out 
later that it should have been taken) and the risk of ‘false positive’ judgements (i.e. 
where action is taken, although it turns out later that the risk was lower than would 
justify it) (Bellamy et al. 2005, p. 51).  
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The research findings further show that, with top down political pressure and 
prescription, information sharing practice is patchy, even within the same 
organisation. Generally, the people involved in these arrangements showed greater 
confidence that confidentiality would be respected appropriately, than that 
information would be shared appropriately. The researchers observed that informal 
‘work-arounds’ were used to address gaps, deal with inconsistencies and reduce 
bureaucratic transaction costs (Bellamy et al. 2008, p. 753). The overall conclusion of 
the research was that deficits in social integration of public officials in cross-agency 
partnerships, as well as deficits in formal regulation, are significant in inhibiting the 
development of consistent and appropriate information-sharing practices. Where the 
volume of information-sharing is increasing, this may be as much the result of 
instrumental, individualistic and coping behaviours as of an increase in formal 
regulation (Bellamy et al. 2008, p. 757). 
 
 
The New Zealand legal context for cross-agency information sharing: the 
Privacy Act, 1993 
The Privacy Act, 1993, has as one of its main purposes the promotion and protection 
of individual privacy, in accordance with the 1980 OECD Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data. The Act is primarily 
concerned with good personal information handling practices and, with few 
exceptions, applies across the public and private sectors in New Zealand. According 
to the Act, ‘personal information’ means information about a living human being: the 
information needs to identify that person, or be capable of identifying that person.  
 
The Act contains twelve information privacy principles dealing with collecting, 
holding, use and disclosure of personal information and assigning unique identifiers, 
such as IRD numbers or driver’s licence and passport numbers. A frequently 
mentioned privacy principle by research participants in this research project is 
information privacy principle eleven2 (especially 11(f)), as follows: 
 
An agency that holds personal information shall not disclose the information to a 
person or body or agency unless the agency believes, on reasonable grounds - 
(a) that the disclosure of the information is one of the purposes in connection with 
which the information was obtained or is directly related to the purposes in 
connection with which the information was obtained; or 
(b) that the source of the information is a publicly available publication; or 
(c) that the disclosure is to the individual concerned; or 
(d) that the disclosure is authorised by the individual concerned; or 
(e) that non-compliance is necessary - 
(i) to avoid prejudice to the maintenance of the law by any public sector agency, including 
the prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution, and punishment of offences; or 
(ii) for the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty; or 
(iii) for the protection of the public revenue; or 
                                                 
2 http://www.privacy.org.nz/privacy‐principle‐eleven/ 
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(iv) for the conduct of proceedings before any court or tribunal (being proceedings 
that have been commenced or are reasonably in contemplation); or 
(f) that the disclosure of the information is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious 
and imminent threat to - 
(i) public health or public safety; or 
(ii) the life or health of the individual concerned or another individual; or 
(g) that the disclosure of the information is necessary to facilitate the sale or other 
disposition of a business as a going concern; or 
(h) that the information - 
(i) is to be used in a form in which the individual concerned is not identified; or 
(ii) is to be used for statistical or research purposes and will not be published in a 
form that could reasonably be expected to identify the individual concerned; or 
(i) that the disclosure of the information is in accordance with an authority granted 
under section 54. 
 
 
Furthermore, the Act gives the Privacy Commissioner the power to issue codes of 
practice that become part of the law. These codes may modify the operation of the 
Act for specific industries, agencies, activities or types of personal information (e.g. 
health information).  
 
 
3. Research Design 
 
In this chapter we further introduce the research methodology used in this study. 
Furthermore, we present the selection criteria used to identify potential case studies and 
explain how we came to our final selection of five case study areas out of an initial 
selection group of twenty programmes. 
 
Research methodology 
The overall purpose of this project was to identify opportunities for improved information 
sharing across government agencies and other organisations in order to achieve more 
effective social outcomes with regard to individuals or families at risk (or imminent risk).  
To be able to identify opportunities for improved cross-government information sharing 
we first of all needed to have an empirical understanding of information sharing practices 
between agencies in areas where public officials are dealing with multiple, fundamental 
problems from the viewpoint of the individual or family, such as combined problems of 
unemployment, poor education, health, housing, and crime. Moreover, we sought further 
empirical understanding of barriers and enablers of cross-government information 
sharing, which we then could use to identify opportunities for improved information 
sharing. 
 
Acknowledging a lack of empirical knowledge on the extent, forms and ways in which 
New Zealand government agencies and other organisations are sharing information on 
vulnerable individuals or families with complex social needs, we used a qualitative case 
study research method to empirically explore multiple cross-government initiatives 
selected on the basis of a predefined set of criteria (Appendix 1). Within five cross-
government programmes, of which three had information sharing protocols in place, eight 
qualitative case studies were conducted between January 2009 and May 2009, involving 
approximately 70 interviews with professionals.  
 
Based on available literature in the area of cross-government collaboration and 
information-sharing (see chapter 2), a set of analytical themes was constructed to explore 
information sharing practices, applied procedures, perceived barriers to information 
sharing and perceived enablers. For instance, themes included ‘relationships with partner 
organisations’, ‘relationships with other professionals’, ‘ways of working’, ‘interpretation 
of information sharing procedures’, ‘experience with information sharing arrangement’, 
‘types of personal information collected and managed’, ‘treatment of sensitive 
information’, and ‘availability and use of ICT-infrastructures/applications’. These themes 
were used in semi-structured interviews with front-line staff members, middle 
management, and senior staff involved in the eight case studies. Empirical data collected 
in the case studies was further tested and developed in three focus group meetings with 
public officials, academics, and legal experts: two focus group meetings took place in 
Wellington on 20 July 2009, and one in Christchurch on 22 July 2009. Furthermore, the 
empirical research findings were further discussed in feedback sessions with research 
participants in Hawke’s Bay on 26 August 2009 and in Auckland on 9 September 2009.  
 
Case study selection criteria and assessment 
Based on available literature, and considering the need to explore a wide variety of 
information sharing practices and experiences, including successful and less successful 
practices and experiences, the following variables were specified for identifying the case 
studies most suitable for inclusion:  
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 Focused on individuals or families at risk (or imminent risk);  
 Complex, fundamental (so-called “wicked”) problems at the intersection of 
multiple policy domains (e.g. social, economic and justice; social, education 
and health);  
 Multi-agency engagement, such as crime, health, housing, income support, 
welfare and education; 
 Varying partner arrangements (e.g. including local government, NGOs, 
private sector);  
 Varying coordination arrangements in cross-government initiatives; 
 Established ways of working between organisations (rather than new 
initiatives or concepts); 
 Initiatives are currently operational; 
 Regional spread of case studies (e.g. urban/rural/metropolitan; South / North 
Island); 
 Sensitivity of personal information being shared (e.g. health, crime-related 
information); 
 Varying information sharing arrangements under the Privacy Act, 1993 (e.g. 
information sharing protocol, Code of Practice, special information sharing 
regime for the Police; no specific information sharing arrangement); 
 Varying characteristics of individuals/or families participating in public 
service design (e.g. active vs. passive case management of ‘participants’; 
state-dependent vs. independent; voluntary vs. obligatory participation; age); 
 Different ethnic groups, including Pakeha, Maori, Pacific Islanders, Chinese 
and other migrants; 
 Variety of available ICT infrastructure, applications, skills and knowledge 
within and across agencies and other organisations involved. 
 
 
To identify potential case studies, a number of public officials were contacted for 
information about current initiatives that involved inter-agency information sharing to 
deal with individuals or families with complex needs. Agencies consulted include the 
Ministry of Social Development; NZ Police; Ministry of Justice; Department of 
Corrections; Office for Older People, Funding and Community; Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner; Office of the Ombudsmen; Ministry of Women’s Affairs; Ministry of 
Education; and the Ministry of Health.    
 
The following selection group of twenty programmes was considered for inclusion in the 
research project: 
 
(1) Priority offenders’ initiative 
(2) Offender reintegration project 
(3) Joint initiative for employment outcomes for prisoners 
(4) High Risk Offenders 
(5) High Risk/ High Profile Forums 
(6) Iwi crime prevention plans 
(7) Supported bail 
(8) EMBAIL - Electronic Monitoring Bail 
(9) Drug & Alcohol Services 
(10) ENROL – tracking students through the education system 
(11) Family Violence Responses 
(12) Foreshore and seabed 
(13) Family Safety Teams 
(14) ENLIVEN – home based support to older people 
(15) Multicultural Service Centre for Refugees 
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(16) Community with Muslim Women in Auckland 
(17) Strong Pacific Families 
(18) Elder Neglect & Abuse Prevention Services 
(19) DHB/ Police initiative in the area of missing people with mental health problems 
(20) Integrated Service Response 
 
 
On the basis of the selection criteria presented above, the initial selection group of twenty 
programmes was assessed as follows: 
 
Complex problem interface 
Of the options considered, some of the initiatives did not meet criteria of dealing with 
‘wicked’ problems relating to social interfaces: tracking students through the education 
system (10) and issues relating to foreshore and seabed (12). Some of the initiatives that 
did meet this criterion were not yet established programmes (or pilots). These included 
the iwi crime prevention (6) and supported bail (7) initiatives. In addition, insufficient 
information was gathered on the initiative with Muslim women in Auckland (16). As 
other initiatives in the selection group dealt with migrant issues, this initiative was not 
considered further.   
 
By eliminating these initiatives, the selection pool was reduced to fifteen initiatives.     
 
Target service participants 
Each of the remaining fifteen initiatives involved individuals or families at risk dealing 
with complex social problems addressed by multi-agency services. In the study sample it 
was desirable to have initiatives that cover a range of service participants. For this reason 
we sought to include initiatives that involve younger and older people, Maori, Pacific 
Islanders, and/or people with mental health issues. The programmes dealing with elder 
abuse (14, 18), Pacific families (17) and the DHB/Police initiative in Fielding around 
missing persons (19) all potentially met these criteria.   
Apart from the iwi crime prevention plan which does not meet the criteria of being 
currently operational, no other specific Maori based programmes were identified by 
informants. It was important therefore that some of the case studies selected include 
components for Maori communities or families. For example, the Age Concern 
programme dealing with elder abuse (18) has areas of focus on Maori and Pacific 
Islanders. Moreover, individual Maori participants are taking part in some of the generic 
programmes, such as the Priority Offenders Programme (1) and the Integrated Service 
Response (20).    
 
It also was desirable to select initiatives that allowed us to explore differences that may 
arise depending on whether information sharing is done with consent of the people to 
whom it refers or whether it is done without either their knowledge, and/or their consent. 
Each of these situations raises different issues regarding privacy protection and how 
agencies deal with information sharing arrangements. The Priority Offenders Programme 
(1) and the High Risk / High Profile forums provided a useful contrast in this respect. The 
information sharing arrangements in place for the Family Safety Teams (13) and Family 
Violence Response initiatives (11) could also potentially meet this selection criterion.  
 
Information needs and support 
Without exception the programmes dealing with ‘wicked’ problems at the social interface 
involved the sharing of information of a sensitive nature (e.g. personal health details) 
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about individuals or families between different agencies. This included programmes with 
both government and non-government organisations involved.   
 
Moreover, some initiatives involved cross-agency technical infrastructure issues, such as 
database access, that needed to be resolved (e.g. Drug & Alcohol Services (9); Joint 
Employment Outcomes (3)).  Several inter-agency initiatives, such as the Integrated 
Service Response (20), Family Safety Teams (13), High Risk/High Profile forums (5), 
Offenders Reintegration Project (2), and Family Violence Responses (11), provided 
examples of technical infrastructure arrangements that could highlight issues of interest.  
 
Another case study selection criterion was to obtain initiatives with different partner 
arrangements and coordination models for cross-agency collaboration and information 
sharing, such as one government agency liaising with several other government agencies 
(e.g. EMBail (8)); several agencies meeting together and discussing the complex needs of 
participants on a case-by-case basis (e.g. Priority Offenders (1)); or the co-location of 
several government agencies and voluntary sector organisations serving individual 
participants (e.g. Integrated Service Response (20)) 
 
Regional spread 
In order to obtain an understanding of information sharing practices throughout New 
Zealand, we wanted to have a regional spread of case studies as well as a mixture of rural, 
urban and metropolitan areas. It was acknowledged that programmes operating on a 
national basis (e.g. Age Concern elder abuse and neglect) were flexible and therefore 
could support this selection criterion.  
  
Operational practice considerations 
In order to obtain a wide variety of information sharing practices and experiences, we 
wanted to include case studies involving successful inter-agency information sharing 
arrangements as well as cases where information sharing had not been successful. In 
talking to agency representatives it became apparent that examples of different practice 
often can be found under the same programme, in different locations. We therefore 
selected six case studies under three programmes that met the variety of case study 
selection criteria and involved differences in information sharing practice and experience.  
 
In total, eight case studies have been explored under the following programmes and 
initiatives (please see Appendix 1 for an assessment per case study area of how selection 
criteria have been met): 
 
1. Multicultural Service Centre for Refugees, based in Wellington 
2. Integrated Service Response: Linwood Service Centre 
3. High Risk / High Profile forums: case studies in Hawke’s Bay and Christchurch 
4. Priority Offenders Initiative: case studies in Christchurch and Papakura  
5. EMBail: case studies in Auckland and the Hutt Valley 
 
 
We emphasise that there was no intention or attempt to evaluate the selected cases. 
Therefore this research makes no comment on issues relating to the efficacy or otherwise 
of the individual initiatives. 
 
Empirical findings are described in the next chapter under the five programme headings 
within which the eight cases studied were located.  
 
4. Case study research findings 
Case Study Area 1: Multicultural Service Centre for Refugees 
 
Programme Short description 
Multicultural Service Centre
for Refugees in Wellington 
 
 Service Centre for refugee communities in 
Wellington. 
 Health and well-being action strategy. Actions are 
monitored by funding agencies. 
 Involves over 20 government departments and 
agencies with multiple funding sources. 
 Focused on meeting the multiple social needs of 
migrants including housing, income support, 
education, language skills development, 
psychological services, employment, health and 
welfare. 
 Similar initiative operating on the West Coast for 
migrants and refugees. 
 Involves NGOs, local government, central 
government and employers. 
 
 
 
Background 
 
Working under the umbrella of the Multicultural Service Centre for Refugees in 
Wellington, four different Wellington-based refugee service organisations were included in 
this case study. These organisations are part of the network of government and non-
government agencies providing resettlement services for refugees who have entered New 
Zealand under the annual Refugee Quota Programme. Quota refugees are “people whom 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has mandated as refugees overseas” 
(Wellington Region Action Plan 2006, p.7). Selection for resettlement in New Zealand is 
based on those with the greatest need for refuge and protection. On arrival in New Zealand, 
refugees spend six weeks in the Mangere Resettlement Centre where they receive 
information on New Zealand society and are assessed for health needs and any other 
treatment required. From Mangere, they are relocated to different parts of New Zealand.  
 
The agencies included in the case study are: 
 
 Wellington Change Makers Refugee Forum – a refugee-based NGO representing twelve 
refugee communities in the Wellington region. The forum facilitates capacity building of 
refugee communities; represents the interests and concerns of refugee communities at the 
local and national level; advocates on resettlement issues; and provides information 
services to refugee communities throughout New Zealand. Change Makers is funded by 
grants, contracts for services, and in-kind support.  
 ESOL (English as a Second Language) Assessment and Access Specialist Service – 
funded by the Tertiary Education Commission this service provides a range of 
assessments, advice and referrals to appropriate ESOL providers to migrant and refugee 
clients. 
 Wellington Refugees as Survivors (RAS) – community based specialists providing 
mental health services to refugees under the Refugee Quota Programme. The agency 
depends on grants and donations. 
 Refugee Services Aotearoa New Zealand – a not-for-profit, non-government 
organisation, registered under the Charities Act, 2005. The agency is jointly funded by 
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Each of the above organisations is funded separately. Some are funded by government 
organisations, and others depend on grants and donations. Collectively, the agencies 
included in this case study provide a range of resettlement services including assistance 
with housing, income and employment; language skills; mental health services; and 
advocacy and co-ordination services. Some service agencies are contracted on a regional 
basis especially for capacity building and training of people dealing with refugees. This can 
involve health professionals and social workers providing services as far a field as 
Masterton, Palmerston North, Napier and Nelson. Services relating to cultural 
competencies, including interpreters, are also provided in these areas. 
 
The above-mentioned organisations also interacted with other agencies in providing 
services to refugees, including: Immigration NZ, Housing NZ, Regional/ local government, 
MPs, Ministry of Education – tertiary and primary, DHBs (Capital Coast and Hutt Valley), 
Police, Internal Affairs, Ethnic Affairs, Work & Income, CYF, Study Link, ACC, Mental 
Health Foundation, ESOL National Office, Courts (especially Family Court), Family 
Violence Units, and Corrections.  
 
 
Information needs and requirements 
 There is wide variation in the information needs of different agencies – from limited, 
abstract information needs to extremely detailed information needs. Moreover, 
information needs can involve different policy sector-related information sets. 
 Implicit information needs and the lack of information sharing have an impact on 
personal safety and community safety. Schools in particular don’t ask enough 
information from refugees or other refugee servicing organisations. This is risky as it 
means that front-line staff do not have information required to protect themselves. 
 Sometimes the information requirements of government agencies clash with the 
cultural norms of refugees. For example, in some cultures if a young person 
(particularly a girl) is unmarried they are expected to live at home. For Housing NZ if 
there is overcrowding in a residence, adult children should live independently. Thus 
who does what with the information is as important as the information itself. 
Government department demands may lead to inadvertent social consequences that 
they do not anticipate, or understand. 
 Newcomers often do not understand New Zealand values. Consequently, they do not 
know when information requirements can be compromised or changed (according to 
the different requirements of different agencies), or what is law and therefore will not 
be changed. Many new people think information requirements from different agencies 
are similar things. 
 Information provided to newcomers on New Zealand is not balanced. It is either based 
on a marketing approach whereby everything about the country is fantastic, or it is 
focused on ‘you must do XX or these will be the consequences’. People coming from 
countries with repressive regimes can be very frightened by the threat of consequences 
because they are unsure what this means in the New Zealand context. 
 It is not enough to give clients information only once. People learn from experience; 
then the written information makes sense. Sometimes when people first arrive in New 
Zealand and in the Mangere Centre, they are too traumatized to take in the majority of 
what they are told. 
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 Information sharing practices and procedures 
 
 Personal information collected on individuals is shared between agencies in 
accordance with legal requirements. For instance, all clients sign a consent form to 
enable agencies to share information about their case. In asking for consent, 
consideration is given to an individual’s privacy, but the paramount consideration is 
the safety of the individual, families, and the community. A formal complaints 
procedure is available.  
 In some cases clients consent to information sharing between health and 
psychological service personnel.   
 In some cases refugees give consent but are not clear what they are giving consent 
for. There are questions as to whether people understand what agencies do with their 
information and how agencies fit or collaborate together (i.e. who has access to the 
information for what purpose). Moreover, some of the consent processes are not 
comprehensive and limited in their effectiveness. For example, Resettlement may be 
authorised to work on the client’s behalf, but the agency is not authorised to release 
information. In some situations this becomes unworkable. 
 There are agency differences around what is valid information to share, or not share. 
There are also different processes around the collection, storage, retrieval and 
provision of information, and different expectations by officials from different 
agencies. When refugees are interacting with a range of agencies, these variations in 
information provision requirements can be confusing.  For example, there are a wide 
range of rules with respect to the age at which you can do various activities in New 
Zealand (such as drink alcohol, drive a car, vote, live independently, or claim study 
assistance). How can people from different cultures and backgrounds be informed 
most effectively on these matters? 
 There is a clash between government information sharing processes (top-down) and 
those of NGOs (grass roots). Government agencies tend to use an advisory / expert 
model in devising policy and then dictating this to NGOs. 
 There are a lot of ad hoc networks set up to share information across the various 
agencies servicing refugees. This leads to duplication and information overload (e.g. 
five copies of the same information coming in via email). When staff get overloaded 
with information it is hard to sort out what is important.  
 It is unclear what government agencies do with information they receive from NGOs. 
For example, reports are sent from ESOL to a government Service Centre 
electronically. The Service Centre is only interested in having received the report so 
it can mark a box for compliance requirements for ongoing funding. It is unclear, 
however, who sees the report, who uses it, or how it is being used by officials. 
 
 
Information gaps and fragmentation 
 From an agency perspective, there is a big gap in knowledge about refugees: what are 
their needs? What services do they require? How satisfied are they with the services 
they have received? Has resettlement been successful for them? 
 The initial breakdown in information sharing is in how people are categorised and 
recorded at the point of entry into the country. Particularly with respect to people 
entering under the family reunification programme, there is more information that 
government agencies should know. A general solution would be to have forms 
designed to identify people’s needs more effectively. 
 The refugees who enter the service as quota refugees are easily identifiable, but there 
are a number of others who enter the country under the family reunification policy. 
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 A large number of organisations, government and non-government, hold bits of 
information on individual refugees, but no-one has the full picture. Common sets of 
information need to be collected to know what is actually happening around core areas, 
such as housing and health: what are people’s needs? What is currently happening? 
What are the short and long-term impacts? 
 Each independent body collates information independently. An effective reporting 
relationship is hard to establish. As a result, organisations fall back on forging personal 
links with individual central government personnel who are “willing to talk” in order to 
make them aware of services and provide information. This is personality dependent, 
ad hoc, impermanent and unstable. The longer the individual is in service, the greater 
the likelihood of good, sustainable networks developing. 
 
 
Treatment of sensitive information 
 Some privacy issues are delicate when staff members are dealing with people who may 
have had traumatic experiences in their originating country, but disclosure of that 
information is perceived critical for accessing and planning services. It is also seen as 
critical information with respect to the potential substantive impacts on the family and 
the community. For example, there may be serious health issues such as HIV, PTS or 
physical disabilities (such as amputation, artificial limbs or eyesight, hearing problems 
that affect the ability of the individual to access services). 
 There are issues relating to the sharing of personal information across agencies. Often 
there is no place for establishing protocols to manage information sharing across 
agencies. Agencies gather a lot of information that other services could find useful, but 
they are not sure how to share it, or who to share it with. If staff members perceive a 
risk involved to staff or members of the community, they go to Refugee Services. 
 Health agencies are different from other agencies in multi-agency arrangements in the 
sense that they are quite formal and have their own protocol for the protection of health 
information.  
 There are a lot of different agencies involved in refugee’s lives, and their personal 
information can be quite sensitive. There is sometimes an overlap of critical services, 
but no overlap of mandate regarding what information can be, or should be, shared. For 
example, ESOL may find that health, mental health, or trauma issues emerge in the 
classroom: do they need to do anything with this information? Who do they refer 
people to with severe depression? Sometimes if refugees receive the wrong 
information, or the wrong people are involved in service provision, it can lead to 
serious misunderstanding and result in a real mess. 
 
 
ICT infrastructure, applications, skills and knowledge 
 There is no use of ‘shared workspace’ functionality.   
 Organisations rely on email distribution lists for information sharing. 
 NGOs generally do not have ICT infrastructure support, technical skills or knowledge. 
These are not included in their core competencies. Moreover, there is no dedicated 
technological expertise available to NGOs because there is no funding for it.   
 Across organisations involved people do not know what they do not know with 
technology. They are unaware of possible alternatives for technical support.  
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Barriers to effective information sharing perceived by research participants 
 One of the major problems for refugees is cultural assumptions made about information 
by public officials. For example, assumptions that the use of language is consistent 
across cultures (especially through the use of acronyms); assumptions made about how 
people from different cultures or religions will think and what is important to them; and 
assumptions about what people know and do not know.  
 There is a major information gap in the resettlement process in New Zealand. A 
comprehensive social-psychological assessment is carried out on each individual by the 
UN High Commission for Refugees prior to them arriving in New Zealand. This report 
may be available to the Refugee Services staff at the Mangere Centre (although this is 
unclear). Extracts are taken from the report for follow-up assessment in New Zealand, 
especially with respect to health and/or mental health. Appointments with specialists 
are made for the individual in the area where they are relocated. The local PHO deals 
with this. Critical information, however, is not sent to the Refugee Services agencies. In 
some cases, relevant information may be passed on to doctors or other medical 
personnel, but this information often has implications for other services, such as 
transport or disability care. In one case, a social worker finally did a home visit because 
an individual was not showing up to scheduled appointments to find this individual to 
be a double amputee: this information had not been shared with any of the relevant 
agencies. 
 There is often no sharing of ‘intelligence’ within an agency and between agencies.  For 
example, what are the needs, gaps and barriers to accessing language services in this 
country?    
 Lack of, or breakdown in, communication between agencies focused on their own 
agenda causes hardship to clients. For example, Work & Income can cut off benefits or 
other forms of support (e.g. study support) because of single eligibility criteria (e.g. 
turning 19) without knowledge or understanding of the full picture or consideration of 
the social and family circumstances involved. This can create flow-on complications 
with other parts of the system, such as housing (rent) or employment. Similarly, CYF 
are taking children into care and placing them with families where there may be 
religious incompatibility, thereby placing the agenda of the organisation in conflict 
with the needs of the clients. 
 When language difficulties complicate the ability of individuals or families to obtain 
relevant information, circumstances can become very difficult. Refugees are being 
asked to fit into boxes that do not work, because these boxes were designed for 
mainstream clients and government-centric purposes. Consequently, government 
departments are effectively creating problems instead of providing services that 
alleviate problems. 
 Information issues arise when refugees do not understand the system, but also when 
people within the system (especially at the front-line) do not understand the system. For 
example, clients experience that 0800 operators often do not give out consistent 
information. In addition, they often say they cannot access a file (citing the PA) even 
for the purpose of making an appointment. Different things happen to different clients. 
For example, clients quite often can get a different response by simply putting the 
phone down and ringing again and getting a different operator. English speaking 
people, especially if they are sounding officially, are likely to be dealt with more 
efficiently. Similarly, dealing with front-line staff in person often depends on the skills 
of the individual operator at the time. This is frustrating for newcomers who are 
attempting to be independent and not use intermediaries.  Documents usually are wordy 
and even interpreting some of the consent requirements are difficult. The personal 
circumstances of refugees is often complex and takes more than 30 minutes to work 
out, but a client has to wait longer to book in for a longer appointment time with Work 
& Income.  
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 Refugees experience different messages depending on the different people they speak to. 
For example, Community Law Centre, Refugees as Survivors, Local MPs, Refugee 
Resettlements may each have a different perspective. Refugees do not trust people to do 
the things they say they will do. Therefore, they tell their stories to multiple groups: ‘the 
more people you tell, the greater the chance is that something will happen’.  
 Further barriers to information sharing include the constant re-organising of government 
departments where there is a loss of continuity of personnel, loss of knowledge, lack of 
knowledge transfer and sometimes changes in processes and procedures requiring new 
compliance demands. As a result, NGOs face difficulties knowing whom to talk to, who 
is interested, and how to influence policy and funding decisions.   
 
 
Enablers of information sharing perceived by research participants 
 In this case study, information sharing between organisations could be assisted by: 
o Intermediaries being able to make appointments through Work & Income; 
o The sharing of information available from the Mangere Centre (e.g. information re 
health needs) with other agencies; 
o Using existing systems more efficiently. For example, front-line staff using 
interpretation services; and 
o Allowing clients to manage their own personal information and providing it to the 
people they want to – thus making privacy less of an issue.  
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Case Study Area 2: Linwood Service Centre 
 
Programme Short description 
Integrated Service Response     Integrated service centre for individuals and/or 
families with multiple service needs. 
 
 Service Centre: Linwood – co-ordination of social 
services to individual clients with multiple problems 
requiring government services and interventions. 
 
 Includes Work & Income, Career Services, Housing 
NZ, Health, Education, co-located in a single office 
(Christchurch) 
 
 
 
Background 
 
The Linwood Service Centre, Christchurch, is known locally as the Linwood Community 
Link and is the first of a number of integrated service centres operating throughout the 
country. The notion of integrated service response evolved as a result of the Ministry of 
Social Development (MSD) looking to re-organise the way services are delivered so that 
those people with more complicated problems can get the help they need. A service 
delivery model has been developed that focuses on ‘life events’. Under this model three 
levels of service are posited:  
 
(i) Self help: whereby the client can identify their own need and find the 
information they need to meet their requirements by themselves. The Ministry is 
working on getting services online so that those people can service themselves 
quickly and efficiently at low cost.  
(ii) Minimal help: whereby clients require some additional information or 
assistance. Call centres are focused on providing this level of service. 
(iii) Major service requirements: whereby the client has multiple and/or complex 
needs and requires the assistance of skilled staff to meet their service requirements. 
Linwood Service Centre is designed to provide this type of assistance to clients. 
 
In Linwood, the Service Centre is hosted by Work & Income who own the building where 
the Centre is sited. All of the office equipment in the Centre including computers, desks, 
furnishings and storage facilities, are owned by Work & Income. Other government and 
non-government organisations have been invited by Work & Income to make use of the 
premises to locate staff and service clients on an appointment, or on-site referral, basis. The 
office is fitted for wireless broadband so that other organisations can access internet-based 
capabilities. There are also two stand-alone computers that are not loaded with the MSD 
operating system available for other agencies to use.   
 
Clients who come to the centre are primarily seeking income support or employment 
services. They undergo a ‘client assessment’ using a computer-based screening tool which 
identifies and prioritises their needs. Where appropriate, the assessment officer requests 
permission from the client to share their information with other providers, and refers them 
to either internal or external providers for case management. If the client has very complex 
problems and requires wrap-around services a case management meeting is arranged with 
all providers, or a referral is made to a relevant social worker. 
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Participation in this initiative poses some interesting challenges for agencies. The need for 
collaboration is accepted by agencies. NGOs are not set up or funded to do this work alone; 
there are other advantages to them to work in this way. For example, Work & Income pay 
for the building rental and provide the capital assets in the facility at no cost to NGOs. 
NGOs also receive referrals as a direct result of their involvement, and their funding is set 
according to the number of referrals they handle. On the other hand, not all organisations 
are set up in such a way that participation is possible. For example, IRD is not set up in a 
distributed fashion. They operate using Contact Centres and large service centres in order to 
use their resources most efficiently, therefore it is quite challenging for them to act in a 
collaborative way. 
  
NGOs have been offered the Service Centre as private space to provide services from, but 
as yet this has not been taken up. Those agencies participating in the initiative have staff 
located at the centre on a part-time basis, as a satellite working space in addition to their 
central locations in other parts of the city.   
 
Originally, Work & Income just issued an open invitation to share office space. The 
initiative has been operating for one year now and the partners are taking a more strategic 
approach towards providing services in an integrated way: collectively they are looking at 
what services are required and which services can be delivered at different times. A one-
stop-shop is about the client accessing different information in the same place; this is about 
actively working with a person to improve their life circumstances. 
 
At the moment the following organisations work out of Linwood: Work & Income, DBH, 
Housing NZ, Career Services, Workbridge, Tenants Protection, Single Women as Parents, 
Catholic Social Services, and the Salvation Army (Oasis Gambling Centre). Other agencies 
have been involved with the Centre, but no longer operate from there. These include: Inland 
Revenue, Community Probation, ACC, Kingdom Resources and Supergrans. 
 
 
Information needs and requirements 
 Over 250 people visit the centre each day. They are a mix of people, ranging from 
clients who are coming for pre-set appointments and are in crisis, to those who want 
support but have no appointment. Some are transfer-ins from other locations in New 
Zealand (or other parts of Christchurch) and some are new business.   
 There are three assessors working for Work & Income who do the initial screening 
when people come in. The sole role of the assessor is to identify the client’s needs, and 
the appropriate services required to meet those needs. The client group with complex 
circumstances is worked on intensively using a team-based approach.   
 An electronic assessment tool is designed to ascertain what service is required; how 
urgent the service is; and who can best deliver to this particular client (i.e. what is the 
priority need). The tool asks high level questions to assess high level needs – e.g. 
housing, health, child care, employment, budgeting. Assessors can elicit additional 
information and this is sometimes included in the ‘notes’, but information outside of 
that required for assessment of income support eligibility is not routinely asked. 
 The assessment process is client driven as they identify their own needs. It is a pathway 
to getting those needs met. The drawback of the tool is that you do not get what you 
need if you are not clear, or do not say clearly what you need. Some client’s lives are so 
complicated that sorting out their needs is difficult. 
 The assessment tool is drawing out more information from clients at an earlier stage 
than ever before. Complaints to MSD are down, and client satisfaction indicators are up 
55 to 80 per cent. There is a 17 to 20 per cent increase in referrals from other sites. 
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 Staff perceive this relatively new assessment tool as ‘work-in-progress’: “we are 
working out how to get the right balance between an individual’s privacy and what 
staff need to know to provide the appropriate services. For example, how much do we 
need to know about health, gambling, addiction, probation, courts and justice, and 
how does this information impact on a person’s income support eligibility?” 
 Sometimes the quality and quantity of information gained from clients depends on 
the attitude of staff. if they are seen to be non-judgmental they can obtain more 
information than is required for the assessment. The burden of judgment then falls on 
the individual staff member: “what do I do with this information?” The information 
may be confidential. Unless the staff member judges that they are personally in 
danger, another staff member is in danger, or the community is in danger, then the 
information may very well be ignored. Common sense is often applied – for example, 
ringing a person’s GP on the spot, especially in a crisis situation. 
 The partner’s management group is working to develop a formal feedback 
mechanism that will produce useful outcome information. Current outcomes are too 
broadly defined. Stability in the client’s life over a 3-month period is the key 
outcome indicator.   
 
 
Information sharing practices and procedures 
 If a referral is made to another agency, a ‘client consent form’ is filled out and signed 
by the client. The consent form has been designed by Legal Services in Head Office to 
conform to the Privacy Act. This is regarded as a critical tool as it lists all of the 
agencies requiring access to the same set of information.  
 A copy of the paper-based client consent form is stored in a file at Linwood. However, 
other agencies have not asked for a copy so far. 
 The assessment is printed and handed to the client. They then have the choice as to 
whether to pass that on to other agencies when they meet with them. Referral 
appointments are sorted out electronically. DOB/ Name/Address information is being 
shared with referral agencies. 
 Referrals are made by hand-shake if relevant service workers are available on the 
premises and free at the time. Otherwise an email referral is sent by MSD staff, or a 
photocopy of the screening tool is left on their desk in the centre. The client identifies 
the other agencies they wish to have their information (e.g. drug & alcohol services, 
GP, probation officer): the referral form is given to the client in order for them to 
provide it to the relevant agency. The client also identifies the lead agency, or the lead 
contact person they want to work with them. 
 The ‘lead agency’ is an important aspect of case management. Work & Income is the 
early identifier using the assessment tool. If a referral to another agency is made, that 
agency then takes over the information exchange with the client. They decide what is 
relevant information, or irrelevant information, and therefore what information goes 
back to Work & Income for income support assessment. The other agency is the 
gatekeeper of the information sharing at this point. 
 Case managers work with clients through pre-set appointments after the initial 
screening process has been completed either at the Service Centre, or through a Contact 
Centre. They receive the assessment screen via email and use this to chat with clients 
about their individual circumstances.  Sometimes, the face-to-face contact brings out 
things that were not picked up on the form, or a change in circumstances since the 
assessment was done. For example, a child may have subsequently left care or come 
into care, or a person may have a new partner. These things affect a person’s income 
support entitlement.  
 The Contact Centre has a screen similar to the assessment tool. This captures the 
person’s circumstances and provides a pre-assessment of what services are required. 
They also set a client number for the case, and set up the appointments with the Case 
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 Service Centre staff receive regular training with regard to the Privacy Act and the 
Official Information Act. 
 
 
Information gaps and fragmentation 
 Staff are overcautious with using the Privacy Act in information sharing relationships 
between organisations. As a result, the Privacy Act slows down quality services targeted 
at clients with complex needs and with the right intentions.  
 Sometimes staff get information that may negatively impact on a person’s income 
support assessment. For example, a solo mother may come to a Strengthening Families 
meeting with a partner. This raises questions for staff members: in what circumstances 
can this information be shared, and with whom? How can it be shared – informally or 
formally? In general, as a result of the Privacy Act, staff perceive that they cannot share 
personal information with other organisations. 
 Agencies have different agendas and therefore use information in different ways. This 
sometimes leads to information sharing ‘conflicts of interest’ between frontline staff of 
different agencies. As a result, information sharing doesn’t happen or need to be 
negotiated. 
 Problems arise through procedures not matching the requirements of particular 
individual’s situations. For example, when people come out of prison, they do not have 
the multiple identification requirements necessary to get some income support assistance.  
That is, they require photo ID, their birth certificate and two forms of validated ID (i.e. 
showing they are living at a particular address such as a power or phone bill). These 
requirements are aimed at the small percentage of clients who have defrauded the agency, 
but these strict business rules prevents providing services to clients in need. 
 Feedback often occurs directly between professionals, but is not yet formally captured. 
 Monitoring of the service is done on an EXCEL spreadsheet. It is up to the case managers 
to fill in the information – if they remember. Only informal information is available from 
the NGOs, as the spreadsheet is completed by MSD staff only. 
 There is no centralised database that all partner organisations can access. At the moment 
the screening summary sheet is (i) emailed; (ii) photocopied; or (iii) handed to the client 
to pass on to the relevant service. 
 The Contact Centre in Christchurch (but not in Linwood) needs to be able to direct clients 
to services.  They have to have a national basis for their information therefore manual 
processes are not feasible. The 0800 number may be answered in Auckland. 
 The long-term plan is to open access to all information. The Linwood Service Centre as 
an island is not a sustainable solution. 
 Staff perceive the need to resolve information sharing problems in a practical fashion. A 
balance is necessary – not letting information sharing get too much of problem so that it 
inhibits success, or creates a bigger problem than is necessary. 
 
 
Treatment of sensitive information 
 The partner agencies work together to work out how to manage privacy issues. It is about 
sharing information, not using it in a punitive way. The sharing of information is used to 
build trust between the case worker (Work & Income), NGOs and the client. It is an 
ongoing process to identify clear lines around what information is used for what 
purposes. 
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 The Privacy Act is used to minimise discretionary mistakes. Staff err on the side of 
caution. It is a public management challenge to work within the rules and protect 
individual privacy with so many cases involved. 
 Privacy can be an issue for clients, but only for those who do not want to be in the 
game: if you do not want help, you do not get help. 
 It is made clear to the client that information about personal circumstances will not be 
“dobbed in” to Work & Income or other agencies, but at the same time an agency does 
not support bad or unlawful behaviour. 
 Staff have concerns about the protection of an individual’s privacy caused by the open 
office plan design: for instance, clients potentially could listen into conversations 
between staff and other clients; clients potentially could look at personal details 
displayed at computer screens from a distance. 
 NGOs are not so rigorous about the safety of information required by government 
agencies. They do not understand the constraints. 
 Some NGOs have privacy officers who monitor compliance; other NGOs do not have 
the resources for privacy officers. 
 
 
ICT infrastructure, applications, skills and knowledge 
 Linwood operates on a web-based system sitting on a server on the premises. Because 
it is web-based it has inherent security problems. However, the information cannot be 
transferred outside the MSD system. So, at this point the screening tool is only 
available to MSD staff. An inter-agency facilitator is currently emailing each agency 
the referral appointments. The calendar functionality in Microsoft Outlook is used but 
other agencies can not access it remotely. 
 Five providers want to trial the screening process for those clients who come directly to 
them. There are issues of technical interoperability between the systems of the partner 
organisations. It is a stand-alone web-based system.  
 The office is fitted for wireless, and there are two stand alone PCs that do not have the 
MSD operating system on them so they can be used by other agencies. Housing NZ 
staff bring their own computer and hook it into the MSD server. DBH has a portable 
office. The Community Probation officer has a laptop. All of the other organisations 
work manually, especially NGOs who do not have the resources for portable 
equipment. 
 The flow-on effects of the assessment tool are not yet sophisticated. For example, lead 
agency and information security depend on co-operation between professionals using 
manual processes. 
 There is technology that allows for collaboration that is not used by the Centre. For 
example, there are capabilities to send tasks via email and once the task is completed 
the client case is updated automatically and so are the client profiles. This is not yet 
being used to capacity.  Authorities and access between agencies has to be resolved.  
 Technology solutions are not always the answer. For example, electronic calendars can 
help, but sometimes a crude spreadsheet works just as well. Outlook is likely to be used 
across agencies to resolve the interoperability issue. 
 
 
Barriers to effective information sharing perceived by research participants 
 “Legislation (e.g. the Privacy Act) has been introduced for worst case scenarios. In 99 
per cent of the cases staff are fine. However, if they break the law they do it for the 
right reasons. Common sense needs to prevail”.  
 Issues around privacy protection are not emerging in the needs assessment with the 
client, but in relationships between organisations. 
 There are Privacy Act issues around sharing medical information between agencies. 
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 The client controls the information provided to the various partner organisations. For 
example, the client needs to pass on the referral form to the agency concerned. Moreover, 
service provision to clients could improve by finding a way to avoid specific consent for 
each individual case. 
 NGOs face an awkward situation in the current environment of fiscal prudence. They 
need to attract funding by proving the value of participating in an initiative of this 
order, but do not have the information resources or technical capability to do so.  
 
 
Enablers of information sharing perceived by research participants 
 There is a hard balancing act between common sense and getting the job done. The 
relationships around town you have and the trust you earn are critical for information 
sharing and doing your job effectively. Community knowledge and word-of-mouth are 
strong in a place like Christchurch. It would be beneficial if organisations would have 
an information sharing protocol between each other. 
 At the moment, there is only a service assessment done for Work & Income. Staff 
would like to see service assessments done for all partner organisations. 
 Linwood managers would like to see a shared workspace developed and they have 
developed their own concept design (refer: Model office concept @MSD). This would 
include a collaborative booking system. It would enable joint responses and the ability 
for more than one agency to share the lead in case management. There is a question of 
funding, and of IT understanding on the part of the service providers.  
 It would be ideal to have the client present at the personal hand-over between the 
service assessor and case manager. 
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Case Study Area 3: High Risk/ High Profile Forums 
 
Programme Short description 
High Risk / High Profile
Forums 
 Monthly meetings held for planning the management 
of high risk offenders once they are back in the 
community. Involves the agreement of release 
conditions. 
 Does not involve the prisoners themselves (i.e. 
agency planning purpose). Planning can start up to 
eight months prior to release, but more often focused 
on those four and two months prior to release. 
 Involves Corrections (prisons’ management, 
probation, and psychological services), Police and 
community service providers 
 Type of information shared can involve offender 
history, personal details and service needs. 
 Eight forums that cover the whole of NZ. 
 Uses a national database because of the mobility of 
the prison population. 
 
 
 
Background 
 
HR/HP forums are an internal Corrections Department initiative seeking to improve release 
arrangements for prisoners who are categorised as high risk and/or high profile based on 
their offending history; behaviour within the prison; likelihood of re-offending and/or risk 
to the community; and the level of public interest in their release. The recent Corrections 
Amendment Act, 2009 provides for an increase in the amount of information sharing on 
highest risk offenders about to be released from prison. The previous Act (2004) only 
provided for the sharing of information following release.  
 
The intention of the HR/HP forums is to improve the interfaces between the range of 
agencies involved in the release and the management of prisoners in the community. This 
includes improving communication and co-operation between the various arms of the 
Corrections Department (Prisons management, probation, and psychological services). It 
also involves improving the relationship between the Department and Police and other 
government and non-government agencies involved in managing prisoners once they move 
back into the community. 
 
Prisoners are identified as high risk (HR) based on a number of identifying flags within the 
various Corrections databases including psychological and behavioural risk assessments, 
breaches of prison discipline, length of sentence for violent offending, and child sex 
offender classifications. These ratings are recorded electronically, and once they are 
invoked they automatically create a record in the HR/HP database. The HP classification is 
an in-house classification that includes “any prisoners who are likely to attract media 
attention or arouse public reaction beyond that which might be reasonably expected” 
(Corrections Circular, 25 August 2008). Prisoners meeting this criterion but who are not 
classified as HR are added manually to the database at the discretion of the Corrections 
staff.   
 
Access to the HR/HP database is on an approvals basis and separate authentication is 
required to log in. While the data in the database is sourced from the central Corrections 
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operating system ‘Integrated Offender Manager System’ (IOMS), it is a separate system 
and does not update any information in IOMS.   
 
This initiative involves managers from a range of prison services (including corporate, 
health, sentence planning and reintegration planning), and those of other branches of 
Corrections – community probation and psychological services. In some cases, Crime 
Prevention Officers from within the prison are involved. The HR/HP forums are attended 
by senior personnel (e.g. Prison managers, Principal Psychologists, Probation managers) 
from within Corrections. NZ Police intelligence staff or CIB officers also attend in some 
areas. Under the forum guidelines CYF can be invited to meetings to discuss particular 
cases if necessary. This doesn’t actually happen in either region studied but follow-on 
meetings do take place between members of the reintegration team and other agencies. The 
chair of the HR/HP forum is rotated between the three branches of correctional services: 
community probation, psychological services and prisons.  
 
Prisoners are identified eight months before release, and the forum participants populate the 
database with release arrangements as they become available. The HR/HP database 
contains fields for Name / Dates (entry into prison; release date) / Offences / Previous 
offending / Length of sentence / Intended release date / Information from each service, 
including Police / planning progress. Concerns or issues that need to be addressed before 
prisoners are released in order to minimise the risk to the community are identified. 
Attendees take responsibility for ensuring that, in their area of responsibility, appropriate 
arrangements are made to address these issues.   
 
There is another internal liaison meeting focusing on the management of complex cases 
that involves Corrections, social workers and custodial managers. It deals with complex 
cases where people are identified as problematic. They pose a high departmental risk, rather 
than necessarily a community risk. There is common ground about custodial and 
management plans for these people, and it often involves a lot of health information. 
Representatives from this group are starting to attend HR/HP. 
 
Case study respondents described the HR/HP initiative as a bridge between sentence 
management and release management. They indicated that as a result of the forum they 
have more confidence that HR offenders are both treated effectively in prison, and that the 
management of that person once they are released back into the community is as good as it 
can be and that the necessary support is in place. Respondents see this as a positive move 
towards a more integrated ‘offender planning’ process, and an effective means of reducing 
risk to the community. 
 
 
Information needs and requirements 
 The common thread is ‘what do people need to know?’ It may only be the prisoner’s 
intended address, and what their likelihood of re-offending is. Community safety is the 
paramount consideration. The key information that managers are interested in is where 
the person will reside in the community. Other planning hinges on this information. 
 The focus of the forum meeting is on the profile of the prisoner and their offending 
patterns. What are their reintegration needs – residence / relationship issues / victim 
issues / rehabilitation needs / programmes to reduce the risk to the community? Forum 
members are looking for information on completed programmes, intelligence from 
crime prevention officers (working as intelligence gatherers within prisons), and any 
reports on their behaviour while in prison. 
 The database provides input to the preparation of pre-release planning. The primary 
focus is to identify reintegration and rehabilitation needs so these can be addressed on 
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 An eight-month time period for preparation before Parole Board is adequate because of 
the number of people who have to intervene before release. A longer warning time is 
useful, because it allows time to make things happen for those with more complex 
needs.  The release process is smoother. 
 Managers second-guess what information the Parole Board requires. Before HR/HP it 
was very much a mechanical, tick-box approach. The HR/HP forum is more about 
informed decision-making and planning to address release needs.  
 Parole Board’s will now take ‘unproven’ information into account, but only things that 
are proven or substantiated are going into the formal reports. Staff are conscious that 
the reports are discoverable. 
 For Police CIB, information provided at HR/HP forum meetings is ‘in process’ and not 
finalised. It therefore is of little value for investigation purposes. Information may be 
passed on to the Police Intelligence branch if it is relevant, either informally or via 
email. 
 All custodial staff keep extensive daily records of prisoners – at entrance to the facility; 
risk assessment done on every new entrant into a Unit (B14); any custodial incidences; 
any changes in circumstances – health/ family/relationship.  The primary source of 
information is prisoners/ staff conversations, but formal reports (e.g. B14 or incident 
reports) are entered into IOMS.  Evidence / file notes can work to protect staff. 
Sentence Planning reviews – file notes are recorded on all interactions with prisoners. 
Hard copies of the files travel with prisoners when they are transferred – warrants/ 
telephones/ B14/ segregation records/ sentencing notes/ Police summary of facts. 
 Reintegration Case Workers (RCW) are assigned to help prisoners coming to the end of 
their sentence to establish a reintegration plan including accommodation, employment, 
psychological care, community support, and health care.  If a prisoner is referred from 
the HR/HP system the number one priority is to establish accommodation intentions 
and get a verified address on release. 
 
 
Information sharing practices and procedures 
 Principle 11 of the Privacy Act gives a mandate to operate and staff are hardly 
restricted. A common sense of ‘safety first’ over-rides privacy concerns: “The bottom 
line is that I would rather be hauled in front of the Privacy Commissioner, than in front 
of the Coroner’s Office”. 
 Privacy is restricted to health issues and it is usually not relevant to re-offending 
therefore doesn’t need to be on the table anyway. Only information that is relevant to 
the task to be achieved is shared; not all of the information known about a person. 
 Information is provided by chaplains, health workers and programme staff. As 
professionals they know how to share vital information without sharing actual, factual 
details that might breach a person’s privacy.  
 “Conversations between professionals at the table are not always suitable for 
expressing in formal documents exactly as they are said”. 
 There are debates about the appropriateness of information sharing. For example, 
psychological services debate whether information they hold should be shared with 
Police personnel at the table.  The critical question is whether the information they hold 
poses a risk to members of the community, victims, or to the prisoner themselves. 
  Everyone is concerned about using information appropriately. 
 Generally, the things discussed in the forum are in the public domain. Other things may 
be discussed, but are not included in the formal notes. Staff are conscious that a person 
may be endangered if they are cited as a source of information, and the file is accessed 
by an inmate through their lawyer.  The balance between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ information 
shared in the forum is about 2:98%. 
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 Professionals who are at the forum meeting all have a community safety agenda. The 
disclosure of information is for a specific purpose – discharging duties as Public 
Servants. The information shared is relevant, useful, and focused on operational 
efficiency. It is about sharing the stress and responsibility for managing the release into 
the community of a difficult group of people. 
 Information sharing is a two-way thing. It is about safety and common sense – “doing 
the right things, rather than doing things right”. People need to know stuff to do the 
job properly. 
 At the meeting Police can share information on the release address, threats made by 
prisoners (or against prisoners), and gain information about issues that might be 
relevant to the public or about release conditions that the Police may be required to 
manage. Police involvement is invaluable to Corrections staff because they are able to 
provide information re family and victims that need to be taken into account in release 
planning. For example, prisons do not know if a Protection Order is in place. 
Corrections is never given much information about actual offending (apart from the 
category of offence convicted on) and therefore it is difficult to plan release safely.  
 There is an HR/HP firewall. It is assumed that if you are at the table then you are privy 
to specific information sets. This includes Police personnel. The role of the Police has 
evolved.  At one stage Corrections instructions prevented sharing HP information with 
Police. Now all HR/HP names are made available to Police representatives on the 
forum two weeks prior to the meeting so a cross reference with Police databases can be 
made. Prior to the HR/HP forums being established Corrections staff were entirely 
dependent on the knowledge of management staff one-month in from release. Police 
are more graphic in their data presentation. They have sentencing and social data which 
is otherwise unknown to the Corrections staff. 
 With the exception of Police, all other forum participants are Corrections staff, 
therefore it is essentially an ‘in-house conversation’. The prison reintegration teams 
work with CYF and Work & Income separately to the forum.  Information is shared 
based on established relationships.    
 Information sharing protocols were released by Head Office in 2008.  These have been 
helpful in setting out how the forums should be run – how it is chaired, and who is 
involved. They operate with a shared chair, so people take equal responsibility for the 
success of the meeting. 
 The HR/HP forum meetings have led to a situation in which information sharing can 
happen more freely now that staff know the other people around the table. Moreover, 
the forum provides more context to shared information; it is not a ‘tick box’. 
 The lines of communication have been significantly improved and have overcome the 
silo operational management that was taking place. There are information sharing and 
feedback loops.  The quality of the information is better because there is an assurance 
that action will be taken. 
 The intention of the HR/HP initiative is to proactively manage risk. The process may be 
handling people unnecessarily, but the effort is worth the risk. 
 People come to the meeting very well prepared. This is the key to making the meetings 
move.  Follow-up tasks are allocated at the meeting, usually for additional information 
gathering.  People take responsibility for this, and are held accountable for it by the 
group at the next meeting. If there are any changes required to the database following 
the meeting these are usually organised by email or telephone. 
 Some managers take their staff into the HR/HP forum meetings, as they have relevant 
information. 
 The forum has other spin-offs in terms of relationships. Other forms of informal 
information and intelligence are shared now that people in the different professional 
groups know each other.  Over the duration of the forum operating managers are more 
confident that the information they are sharing (including that of a sensitive nature) will 
be treated appropriately. There has been a build-up of professional trust. 
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 HR/HP information is only available to the members of the HR/HP forum, but only a 
limited number of people can access or change the information on the system (i.e. 
nominated administrators). Only administration staff (and possibly the forum chair) can 
print from the database. Administrators also provide information on the results of 
Parole Board hearings, and record and distribute notes from the monthly HR/HP 
meetings.  
 The use of the IOMS system has broken down personal information sharing.  The most 
common form of information now is electronic. Computer records can be used as 
evidence though so you have to be careful what is written and how it is written. It tends 
to be very ‘PC’. Staff have to be concerned about the accuracy and professionalism of 
the material kept on the database. All staff are mindful of other disciplines around case 
notes. Everything recorded is evidence based, brief, and OIA compliant. Staff are 
conscious of the fact that the recorded information needs to be able to stand up in the 
case of an enquiry. 
 The database doesn’t restrict information sharing with each other. This can be done by 
direct communication. The right kinds of information are at the table. What isn’t on the 
computer is provided by people present from their own sets of knowledge. 
 A fairly free flow of information is available on IOMS between staff employed by 
Corrections. There are flags within the system that notify PCOs (front-line staff) that 
this person is part of the HR/HP process. There are flags that indicate there is a 
transferability restraint. It is a method of sharing with the custodial staff that this person 
is of interest to the management staff. They then pay extra attention and can raise any 
concerns they have with the relevant manager/s. 
 There are two to three releases per week. Custodial staff find out who the Probation 
Officer will be and speak to them personally at least one month prior to release. A 
‘heads up’ is provided to other professional staff informally. It is about the quality of 
information. It is a professional courtesy to provide as much information as possible. 
Good information sets are based on stable, long-term relationships. You need to know 
things to do the job. It is about community safety, victim protection and victim 
minimization. 
 In smaller towns, Parole Board members track down the Custodial Officers and ask for 
information.  In the early days Sentence Planners and Parole Board members were co-
trained. 
 Sometimes two managers from the same service attend the same meeting just to cope 
with the volume of prisoners discussed in these meetings and to make sure that nothing 
is missed. There is no time to deliberate case management style.  “If it is not relevant; it 
is not shared”. 
 Information sharing is difficult for new staff, but easier for more experienced staff who 
know personnel and have built up trust relationships.  Information sharing without 
prisoner’s permission is OK between prison staff, probation and psych services because 
it is collegial information sharing on a needs basis. 
 Crime prevention information is based on intelligence gathering, not on evidence 
therefore it can be suspected by other staff. If accepted, it can be invaluable. 
 Any release of information from forum (to other staff) has to go through the Chair. 
 Sentence planning officers create the Parole Board reports. They check that every piece 
of information from all parties is available to the Board.  These reports are the link to 
make sure that good quality information is provided to the Parole Boards. 
 There is regional variation re input of Police. In Christchurch, Police check the 
suitability of release addresses in all cases. In Hawke’s Bay this is not routinely done 
unless someone on the HR/HP forum specifically requests it. Furthermore, in Hawke’s 
Bay, the Police do not use the HR/HP database because they do not see value in the 
information contained in it [NB: In Christchurch, Police Intelligence officer attends 
HR/HP; in Hawke’s Bay a CIB officer has the role]. If the Police representative in 
Hawke’s Bay has any concerns about a prisoner to be released it is brought up at the 
meeting, especially if Police wish their concerns to be made known to a Parole Board. 
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 Reintegration Case Workers (RCW) engage with prisoners to get planned 
accommodation information. Prisoners give permission/ consent (by means of a signed 
form) for this information to be passed on to Community Probation. RCW contacts pre-
assigned 
Probation Officer to get accommodation checked out. If the address is not approved by 
Community Probation, the RCW explores alternative options with the prisoner. Where 
supported accommodation with the Salvation Army is used, the prisoner gives 
permission for information on their criminal record and any associated risks they pose 
to be passed on. Prisoners sign information release forms if they are willing for RCW 
to share information with service providers on their behalf. 
 Psychological Services in particular didn’t think they could share information with 
other parts of the service, or Police. Head Office guidelines clarified the situation. 
 Members of the HR/HP forum act as a conduit for information to Unit Staff managing 
the prisoners directly, and service staff from the other agencies. For example, Sentence 
Planning representatives pass on to custodial staff what information is required (e.g. 
planned address on release). Custodial staff obtain the information from inmates and 
pass it back to the Sentence Planning staff who arrange for the HR/HP database to be 
updated. 
 
 
Information gaps and fragmentation 
 Detailed health information is not shared, but critical information is required to do a 
professional job.  If information is critical it is possible to request a Psychological 
Service report release, but this is rare as the information is available in other forms 
from other services (e.g. the Parole Board report).  
 Not all of the front-line officers know about the forum, and only limited information 
from the forum is shared outside it – if management staff have any concerns, or if there 
is release information they require. 
 Some regional staff point at a lack of communication and information sharing with 
H/O, which creates uncertainty. 
 Although IOMS is the general operating system, it contains a number of discrete 
databases with restricted access. Custodial officers in prisons, Probation Officers and 
Psychological Services each have their own separate databases. Each part of 
Corrections has their own ‘business rules’. Information on the HR/HP database is 
entirely separate from normal, clinical file management processes. HR/HP members 
collate information from the separate databases of IOMS that they work from and they 
are imported to the HR/HP database. This is either done by authorised personnel, or 
sent to the prison administrators who enter it. 
 Risk ratings used for populating the IOMS system are not necessarily the best. For 
example, people with Offender Warning Ratings (OWR) ratings do not necessarily 
pose a risk to the community. They are more relevant to Community Planning and 
Probation Services’ (CPPS) operations. The Child Sex Register (CSR) threshold may 
also be too high. It was set at a national level without consultation with local staff and 
does not meet operational needs.  
 Different agencies have different pieces of information for different purposes. For 
example, not all victims register on the Victim Notification Register (VNR) – i.e. that 
they wish to be told when the offender is released from prison.  However, if there is a 
VNR flag on the prisoner’s file the RWC will contact Probation who checks if the 
planned release address is within distance of the victim’s address. Corrections are not 
told who the victim is for anonymity purposes.  
 If an inmate has a flag against him on the Victim Notification Register, but no other 
risk flags he will not appear on the HR/HP register. In this case, the victim information 
is sometimes not known to the managers and inappropriate placements on release can 
be made. 
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 Assessments could be done prior to release in order to inform Parole Board, but there 
are Privacy legislation considerations here. It would only be relevant if they pose a risk 
to the community. 
 PCOs are not picking up and acting on issues that arise at Parole Board meetings 
quickly enough.  They are leaving it until the next hearing is looming and for some 
things this is too late. 
 Some prisoner’s sentences are short and therefore they do not have a Parole Board 
hearing and do not go through this pre-release planning but they can still be a risk to the 
community. 
 Police are only given information from Parole Board Hearings if they have made a 
submission.  [NB: this varies between regions – in Hawkes Bay, by request, the 
Secretary of the Parole Board calls the HR/HP Police personnel directly following 
hearings to inform him about necessary actions, or release arrangements]. The usual 
process is that the action and information flow moves from the Parole Board to the 
Probation service to the Police (following release).   
 Corrections struggle to get information required by the Parole Board. The mind set of 
the Sentence Planning staff has to be changed about how they engage with prisoners 
and what information is required to provide good quality information to the Parole 
Board. Information is not complete at the eight-month point, but should be more 
complete at the one-month point. 
 Prison officers can be compromised because they are not provided with all the pieces of 
information regarding the person they have care of. For example, a prisoner may ask to 
go and stay with X on his release. If the RCW rings X to check this arrangement he is 
breaching the law if a Protection Order is in place. Prisons are not notified when 
Protection Orders are made. 
 It is unclear to front-line administrative staff how much they can tell [often distraught] 
family members. There needs to be a balance with privacy procedures whereby the 
rights and needs of the family are considered as well as those of the individual. 
 Professionals are sometimes being exposed to danger without their knowledge. For 
example, if an inmate has a history of assault on female officers, he may be a risk to the 
female staff in the accommodation facility he has been accepted in, but that information 
is not been passed on to the service provider. 
 There is an ongoing duplication of risk profiles between the different organisations 
involved in HR / HP.  For example, treatment relationship versus custodial versus 
intelligence. Collectively, staff are trying to achieve management oversight for those 
released who are of concern. Possibly, one risk assessment system could be developed. 
It is complicated by the fact that Police and Corrections also use different 
classifications for HR offenders. 
 Information between the Immigration Service and Corrections is limited. For example, 
Corrections have no way of picking up on Deportation Orders and therefore may 
release people back into the community when they should be leaving the country. 
 
 
Treatment of sensitive information 
 In general, staff know when what is being said is not in keeping with the Privacy Act, 
but sometimes it is necessary to make people aware of particular information because 
of safety issues. 
 Custodial staff do not need better access to medical information. If the staff know 
prisoners well enough they will very likely know what’s going on. If staff read the 
written records as well, there is enough information available to do the job. 
 Health reports belong to the inmate. Psychological Service reports are the property of 
Corrections. They have a confidentiality rider: therefore, information can not be shared 
with providers, but information is shared informally for risk assessment reports. For 
example, Psychological Services recommendations go to the Parole Board and the 
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 In the case of a health diagnosis where the prisoner is eligible for a needs assessment, 
information on the prisoner has to travel with the inmate and be provided to providers. If 
an inmate is in the care of the Forensic Team they have to obtain the permission of the 
prisoner to their health information and criminal record to be made available to providers. 
There are networks of community providers and formal sets of information that are 
provided to them. Different providers have different requirements regarding what they 
need to assess suitability of the client for acceptance into the service. 
 Medical staff often tell Prison Officers things to clarify whether the person they are 
dealing with is a suicide risk, or has anxiety, or depression. All of these things affect 
their care. But it is always necessary to be compliant with a community mental health 
service. 
 Prisoners sign a ‘release of information’ in some instances which provides leeway for 
prison staff to share some information across services. Health notes cannot be passed 
on, but health-related information can be verified.  
  Health staff can put relevant information where necessary on a template report such as 
a SMP 35 – Advice to Sentence Planners. For example, ‘methadone programme’ or 
‘surgery’.  It is a case of staff knowing how to interpret the information they get from 
prisoners and other staff members.  There is also ‘Advice to Unit Managers’ forms 
where change in health status is notified. These do not provide medical details but 
provide information on signs to look for, and act as guidance to custodial services.   
 Salvation Army has their own consent forms that give broad access to all kinds of 
personal information including physical and mental health. 
 In Christchurch, all hardcopies of the database distributed to HR/HP members are 
numbered and counted back in following the meeting and then are shredded by 
administrators. In Hawke’s Bay all HR/HP members keep paper-records of the 
database.  “This will only last until it goes wrong”. 
 
 
ICT infrastructure, applications, skills and knowledge 
 The HR/HP database is an Access database in IOMS. The information in it is incredibly 
brief and only provides a notated-form of the details needed for release planning. 
Different sources of information are relied on by managers to collate a picture – 
sentencing plan; parole report; incident reports and so forth. If more information is 
required, custodial officers are asked to provide this directly. 
 The HR/HP database is fairly clunky and not user-friendly. There is room for 
improvement there.  It has been designed to suit IT purposes rather than for the end-
user. For example, the search function has been changed and it is now less useful. 
 IOMS includes the warrants from the Court. This is entered by the Receiving Officers. 
There are three checks done to ensure its accuracy. There is some limited access to 
Police information. For example, links to aliases and previous offending.  
 The HR/HP database is only accessible to Corrections staff; Police do not have direct 
access to the database. Police are sent, via email, a spreadsheet of the HR/HP 
programme with names and relevant information on it (e.g. prison facility/ prison dates/ 
Board hearing date/ Alerts and classifications (e.g. child sex offender) and any victim 
notification requirements. Police then check against their own database and manually 
copy and paste relevant information from the Police database (NIA – National 
Intelligence Analysis) to the XL spreadsheet. This is then emailed back to the prison 
administrator to be manually transcribed back to the HR/HP database. Police have to 
trust that the data is accurately recorded.  
 External email and internet access is very restricted in Corrections to authorised users 
only. Custodial staff are careful about the contents of emails. They file notes and 
incident reports and these are kept as formal information. 
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Barriers to effective information sharing perceived by research participants 
 Barriers are related more to communication breakdowns, behaviour and attitude of the 
professional groups to each other than they are legal. All staff are bound by the Privacy 
Act. Medical staff are also cognisant of the Mental Health Act, and custodial staff of 
the Corrections Act.  
 Generally, there is a strong perception that safety overrules potential concerns around 
privacy. However: “the Privacy Act gets pulled out as a reason for not doing 
something”. 
 Barriers are related to uncertainty about whether important safety-related information 
can be shared with other service providing agencies. There is a lack of education in 
areas of risk. The default position of staff in these situations is not to share information. 
For example, in relationships between Corrections and Work & Income: “legalities 
come up. What does Work & Income need to know? We have to be allowed to give them 
as much information about potential [safety] risks. People are hiding behind the 
Privacy Act. There is a risk for Work & Income of making big mistakes as a result of 
not having enough information.” 
 Barriers are related to a lack of information about legal provisions. Are the right people 
getting the right information? For example, parents are expected to care for people with 
mental health conditions, but are not entitled to health information about them once 
they are legally adults.  Another example is that where prisoners need to be hospitalized 
it is expensive and time-consuming to put in place a plan of care and arrange 
appropriate security. But hospitals won’t release information to custodial staff about the 
health issue so that appropriate planning can take place (e.g. will they be in overnight, 
or for several days; will they be mobile or incapacitated; will they need particular 
equipment?). Yet, the hospital staff require co-operation and information from 
custodial staff so they can do their job.  How do we keep each other safe in these 
circumstances? 
 There are challenges to get the correct people at the table every month. 
 There are questions whether all categories in the database should be there. 
 Case volumes (in Christchurch) are unmanageable. Already some criteria for the forum 
meeting have been changed (e.g. originally included all young persons, and all sex 
offenders) as they were too broad. They have been narrowed down to make them more 
manageable. Police disagreed with some of the withdrawn criteria, but were no party to 
the decision as an external party. 
 Awareness that some information held by Corrections staff could be of use to other 
agencies, but there is no mandate to pass it on. For example, why cannot relevant 
information be passed on to Work & Income so that they could make an appropriate 
work placement? Corrections are aware of some system rip-offs (e.g. income support), 
but have no ability to let other agencies know. 
 There is variation between service providers (e.g. CYF/ Corrections) due to different 
regimes (e.g. protocols) and understanding of information sharing protocols. Different 
interpretations of the Privacy law and information sharing possibilities leads to further 
variation in service provision. 
 There are grey areas wrt information sharing with community-based service providers. 
For example, government agencies often have formal protocols set down in writing 
(e.g. between Corrections and CYF), but many other agencies assist with practical 
needs on release. It is unclear how much can be shared with them, and how the Privacy 
Act can be interpreted around that. A consent form from prisoners often overcomes 
these problems.  
 Personality problems and parochialism between the branches of the department create 
barriers to information sharing.  This is reinforced by different groups having access to 
different information sets.  “Integration should be real, not hypothetical”. 
 Volumes of personnel looked at during the meeting impacts on the quality and quantity 
of information sharing. Quality is also influenced by the way the information is 
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 Emphasis is on the release and the reintegration of the offender; not on the safety of the 
victims. 
 What is relevant information can be very different to Police and Corrections. For 
example, in the case of direct release (i.e. prisoner’s have completed their sentence and 
do not need to appear before a Parole Board) there is no intelligence information on 
their release plans. 
 Credibility of the database with respect to accuracy and reliability is an issue. 
 There is no common training or understanding of the Privacy Act for operational staff. 
 Strict data controls exist within silos of the department, and these are not necessarily 
compatible. 
 There is a more open collegial interface between certain levels of managers as a result 
of HR/HP but not necessarily between operational staff and this can be problematic. 
 Trust issues exist between staff from Corrections and Police, and even within the 
different branches of the correctional service. Patch protection occurs. 
 Information can be misused but this is difficult to manage. For example, debt collectors 
can publish prison officer’s name and addresses. This leads to a ‘dumbing down’ of 
information you are willing to make available. Head Office monitors this to try to 
control it. 
 
 
Enablers of information sharing perceived by research participants 
 All members of the HR/HP forum have the same goal – ensuring community safety. 
There are ways of sharing even sensitive information in such a way that the community 
can be protected without violating a person’s privacy. It comes down to a trust in each 
other’s professional opinion based on information that they may have that is not able to 
be disclosed.  It is person specific, and a case of professional ethical standards. 
Sometimes people have to accept the reliability of information based on good faith, 
relationships, and professional respect. It is a reciprocal process. 
 Relationships building within and between agencies is crucial. Therefore, regular face-
to-face meetings are very important. However, there are budgetary constraints on 
having these meetings (e.g. travel). 
 If the forum were expanded (e.g. to include community-based service providers, or 
other government organisations) the conversation would be more reserved. 
 Greater disclosure of medical information would take the guess-work out of the 
custodial officer’s job.  Access to substantive information could modify the treatment 
or care.  You cannot assess the full extent of the risk you are dealing with if you do not 
have the full information set. 
 There needs to be an interface with the National Intelligence Database (NIA) of Police. 
Usefully release address, release dates and physical attributes could be cross-
referenced. 
 Forensics would be valuable to have at the table. 
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Case Study Area 4: Priority Offenders Initiative  
 
Programme Short description 
Priority offenders initiative 
 
 Providing wrap-around services for prolific offenders.
 Voluntary participation on part of clients. 
 Involves 7 agencies who meet together and discuss 
the needs of participants on a case-by-case basis: 
Police, Probation and Prison Reintegration Officers, 
Housing NZ, Education, CYF, MoH, Work & 
Income. 
 Information sharing protocol developed in 
conjunction with the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner. 
 Types of information include criminal histories, 
personal details and service needs. 
 Pilots running in Kaikohe, Papakura, Rotorua, 
Flaxmere, Porirua, Christchurch. 
 
 
 
Background 
The Priority Offenders Initiative (POI) is a crime reduction initiative, targeted at a small 
group of offenders who are attributed with committing a disproportionate amount of crime 
in their local area. The individual is initially identified by the NZ Police based on their 
offending history. Senior managers from a range of government departments check their 
departmental records to identify and prioritise needs in the individual’s circumstances. 
He/she is then visited by a member of the NZ Police and the senior manager of the agency 
regarded as being best placed to assist the individual to stop, or reduce, their offending.   
 
The initiative arose from analysis of ‘crime families’. For example, an empirical analysis 
was carried out in by Police in Christchurch. It was identified that two per cent of the 
apprehended offenders carried out over 20 per cent of the crime committed in the area. The 
same family names repeatedly appeared. Ten families were identified in the Christchurch 
area as being a focus for intervention. The purpose of the initiative is to provide a high 
offence rate individual with the support and assistance in addressing the social, cultural and 
economic pressures in their lives and thereby provide them with an opportunity to change 
their offending lifestyle.    
 
The identified individuals are invited to participate in the initiative and do so voluntarily, 
usually in consultation with their family/whanau. Offenders do not receive any services that 
any other client would not receive, but they are given priority of service and entrance 
barriers are lowered. The senior managers who work directly with the client have the ability 
to assist with unblocking access to services. Management and case worker discretion is 
involved.   
 
There are a number of agencies involved in this initiative, and the composition of those 
agencies may alter depending on each geographical area where it is implemented. In 
general, key agencies include NZ Police, Work & Income, Community Probation, CYF, 
NZ Housing, and the Ministry of Education. In some areas, the DHB or local health service 
providers are also involved. Although a number of agencies work together, Police 
commitment, ownership and resources drive the process at the local level. 
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Governance and managerial arrangements differ in the geographical areas where the initiative 
is implemented. In the two locations studied the following arrangements are in place: 
 
 In Christchurch there is a three-tier approach: 
1. Governance is provided by the Christchurch Social Policy Inter-agency Network 
(CSPIN) made up of senior operational managers from a range of government 
organisations including, but not restricted to, Police, Education (Chair), Work & 
Income, CYF, Housing NZ, and Corrections. 
2. A Combined Management Group (CMG) provides the managerial oversight of the 
initiative, and acts as the interface between the workers and CSPIN. 
3. A co-located group of workers – Police, CPPS, Work & Income, CYF and Health 
(service provider contracted to the local DHB) – who work directly with the 
families involved in the initiative. 
 
 In Papakura a linear model is used. The initiative is managed and operated by an 
Interagency Senior Managers Group. Members of the group take personal 
responsibility for working with identified individuals and their families. Agencies 
involved include, but are not restricted to, Police, Work & Income, Housing NZ, 
Education, CYF, and Community Probation. This group has been operating over a six-
year period and the POI initiative is one of the more recent aspects of their work. Over 
this period of time, the group has developed a “100 per cent total trust relationship 
with each other”. The ethos of the group recognises the different agendas of each 
organisation, but work towards the same outcome.  
 
The initiative is also operated in Kaikohe, Flaxmere, Rotorua, and Porirua. In some areas 
the Area Commander of Police sits on the inter-agency group, but it has been found to be 
more effective if the management staff involved are mid-managers who have operational 
decision-making capabilities, and time to invest in working with the clients. For example, 
Senior Sergeant/ Sergeant level of Police, and area managers of other agencies. 
 
 
Information needs and requirements 
 It is important to know what information is being shared for and the basis for 
information sharing. What do we need to know? What is the benefit of joining up with 
other organisations – to achieve what? In some cases, not all agencies need to be 
involved. Therefore, officials from those organisations may be party to updates, but not 
the details. At other times, particular agencies may just not be involved at all. Only 
agencies that require the information to do their jobs should be at the table. This may 
require strengthening and using the NGO sector more. 
 
 
Information sharing practices and procedures 
 There is a mandate by management to work together as a single team without 
institutional barriers to information sharing. This is legal within the context of the 
Privacy Act: the arrangement is supported by an information sharing protocol 
developed in conjunction with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner.   
 Information sharing is related to the core business of each organisation. Do agencies 
need to know things for prevention purposes, or are they responsive only? What is the 
role of NGOs? Who does what/ when/ why? The answer to these questions determines 
what information can be shared and who it can be shared with. Everything that is 
needed to be shared is at the table. 
 There are two sets of information sharing happening simultaneously – formal (or 
‘hard’) information and informal (or ‘soft’) information.  The latter is based on instinct 
and judgment; the staff member’s consideration of the context in which they are 
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 There are no management barriers to information sharing between professionals. It is 
consistent with the nature of co-operation and free exchange of information: that is, 
‘soft’ information rather than ‘hard’ information is being shared. 
 There are different interpretations of the value of informal information (e.g. around 
offending / drug usage) versus ‘hard evidence’. This often depends on the mandate of 
the agency, and the experience of the staff. The more experienced staff are, the more 
they understand how valuable informal information can be. 
 The nature of the working relationships determines the level of information sharing that 
takes place. There needs to be confidence that the person being given information has 
the power and/or ability to use it professionally to achieve the best outcomes for the 
safety of the individual, the family and the community. Trust in relationships and 
relationships building is crucial. 
 All information is usually done with consent unless there is a situation of life and death. 
If staff are privy to information which endangers the health or safety of children or 
others, it is shared regardless of the limitations. These situations are very rare, but: 
“pragmatism has to prevail. There is always a balance between ethical considerations 
and practicality. The broader knowledge we have as practitioners, the more ability we 
have to help.” 
 Information sharing between agencies is done at different levels depending on the role 
of the agency itself. There are three levels of information sharing: 
1. Across all agencies – what do we know about these families? How is each 
organisation working with the individual/ family? 
2. Co-location of agency workers who work within existing agency resources, but 
have a mandate to work with other agencies to achieve better outcomes. 
3. Complex family development models – join up the range of expertise available and 
produce better outcomes for the family. 
 Different models are used in this initiative depending on the region: 
1. Case worker model – an individual coordinates and works with the offender and 
their family on behalf of the other agencies 
2. Individual offender works with several different agencies all of whom are 
represented at a local multi-agency group meeting, where a case management 
approach is taken. Different people take responsibility for particular actions. A tag 
team is operated if necessary or there are enough resources available. 
 POI meetings are verbal. Agencies do not keep records; Police do. Clients can access 
official Police records at any time. 
 Every organisation manages their own information and works within their own agency 
rules. In Christchurch, the working group is housed at MSD premises in Papanui. A 
manual working filing system is kept. In Papakura, the Inter-agency Group meets 
fortnightly for half an hour just to make sure that all the professionals are “on the same 
page and aware of all of the key issues”. There is no joint information file; Police take 
minutes including actions and key information shared at the meeting – who is being 
dealt with; what is being done; who is taking responsibility for particular actions. 
 There is no lead agency in the sense that all agencies contribute equally. Police set the 
assessment template and get agencies to fill out parts of it in order to determine whether 
an individual is suitable for the programme.  
 Police identify potential participants in the programme. All agencies involved look at 
their records and decide which organisation is best placed to deal with the person. That 
is, what are the participant’s highest needs (e.g. housing)? A manager from that 
organisation then buddies with Police and leads the case management process. 
 In this initiative families, as well as the individual, give signed consent to share 
information with agencies and with named individuals/ groups they are comfortable 
with. The consequences of the information sharing are made known to the offenders 
and their families before they consent.  
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 The cultural connection to the family is crucial. 
 Service staff usually have the client present and if they need to talk to another agency, 
they have the client’s permission. 
 Head office guidelines have been helpful in focusing the programme. Prior to these it 
was more informal and less focused. 
 The agency leading the case work keeps notes on the actions taken, or details of the 
contact; type of activities carried out (e.g. school uniform assistance); time spent; and 
agency personnel involved. All of this information is sent to head office on a regular 
basis. For example, Police provide a monthly report to the Ministry of Justice on 
progress. At the local level, agencies are unclear what happens to it once it is submitted 
to head office. 
 Police are more willing to share information than other groups as long as it is 
rationalised around reducing re-offending. The people on this programme pose a risk in 
one area (offending) and this has long-term effects on the whole community therefore 
there is a mandate for all organisations to participate. 
 
 
Information gaps and fragmentation 
 There is a definite gap between knowledge of what practitioners do and share and what 
managers think they are sharing – for practical outcomes. 
 Officials are mindful of the constraints around health information. There are some 
things that they do not/cannot share. 
 Health is missing from the table – the problem is that it is a fragmented service at local 
level. Who do you know to interact with? POI Papakura made a request to Health for 
representative support.  This was escalated to H/O but there has been no response to 
date. It is sometimes difficult to know where to access health information from. 
 Having the ability to involve NGOs would be good as they often have data sets that 
would be useful. However, there is a lot of government held information that can not be 
shared with NGOs.  Security inside NGOs is not perceived by government officials as 
being as tight as that within government. The nature of the information held by 
government can also be sensitive and therefore not suitable for sharing with externals. 
NGOs often do not send senior personnel to meetings (as they have fewer resources) so 
they are not seen as taking it seriously. Managers are constrained when not working 
directly with collegial peers.  
 Nobody from Courts participates. It would be useful for other agencies to know about 
Court hearing dates sooner rather than later in the process. 
 Social workers are working with families that have not come to CYF attention – hand-
shaking families into NGO services. CYF role could be that of a differential response 
coordinator. It is currently unrecorded work because it doesn’t fit the organisational 
design structure. Staff involvement requires other people to carry case work loads and 
this leads to internal professional frustration and resentment. 
 In Christchurch, although there is a CSPIN information sharing protocol, organisations 
often grapple with the issue of what information can be shared, how it can be lawfully 
shared and why it should be shared. In this initiative the CMG has the task of trying to 
define the intersection where agencies can share information for the purpose of both 
individual (including staff) and public safety. The Ministry of Justice POI Information 
Sharing Protocol has superseded CSPIN efforts. Although an information sharing 
protocol exists on how inter-agencies should handle information sharing under this 
initiative, it is often new territory that highlights these issues.  
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Treatment of sensitive information 
 The Office of the Privacy Commissioner and the Ministry of Justice have established 
protocol rules for privacy protection under this initiative. 
 Trust is the key word that determines how sensitive information is shared. That is, trust 
between professionals and between professionals and their clients.  
 Sharing confidential information relies on the trust within the group of professionals 
and the understanding that information can be exchanged in a professional environment 
for practical operational outcomes.  For example, at one Strengthening Families 
meeting a new person was uncomfortable about the sharing of names between agencies. 
Everyone ended up talking hypothetically and nothing practical was achieved. 
 There is a code of professional collegial practice which ensures there is “no come back 
on individuals for openly discussing any families or individuals”. Managers 
acknowledge that this practice at the senior management level is different to the 
messages they present to staff.  The explanation proffered for this discrepancy is that it 
is “more controlled in a closed environment;[agency] is a ‘not controlled’ 
environment”. 
 The only information not shared is that from clinical files between patients and their 
doctors. 
 Informal/’soft’ information has to be handled carefully. Where professionals act on 
presumptions based on information they have it could violate the Privacy Act.  If the 
organisation doesn’t need it – why have it? 
 “Rights related to an individual’s safety and security should over-ride their right to 
privacy.” By their behaviour, offenders give up some of their ‘rights’ – not in a legal 
sense, but in a practical, operational sense. They have to be held accountable. Someone 
has to say ‘enough’. Officials have to share information to get the job done. 
 Pragmatism prevails. On occasions staff may inadvertently break the law, but not 
intentionally.  In informal conversations there may be privacy leakage, but information 
is not necessarily being misused as it is being shared for the purpose of getting the job 
done and protecting individuals, families and communities. 
 Feedback from operational people is that privacy has not been raised as an issue in the 
field (i.e. by nominated offenders and their families/whanau). 
 If it is not appropriate to have something written down a conversation can still take 
place.  Officials operating in the field sometimes “have to have a blind eye and a deaf 
ear. There is a need to ensure that what we are doing is legal. Our job is to help 
families through to a legal position without making it too hard.” 
 Professional experience determines where the boundaries are, rather than the 
legislation. It is important to be aware of who is in the room with you. For example, 
professionals may not share information about offenders or families if administration 
staff are in the room.  
 
 
ICT infrastructure, applications, skills and knowledge 
 Each agency has its own secured database. The co-located workers cannot necessarily 
access their own information from their joint premises. A joint paper-file is kept.  
 Security issues arise when staff attempt to access their own databases remotely (e.g. 
through wireless internet connections). 
 The information database is held with the lead agency (Police). It would be difficult if 
the lead were to change. Having minutes in one place is ‘better’: “Even though we trust 
each other it is still better this way [that is, held in one place rather than several 
agencies accessing them]”.  Minutes are not linked to the Police database.   
 Each agency has secured access to limited databases. Everyone has some piece of the 
whole picture required. People working together can share some pieces of information. 
Usually email is relied on, which creates a lot of duplication across the system. 
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 Emails can be frustrating. For example, logos on some departmental letterheads can be 
blocked by agency firewalls or trapped in SPAM folders. 
 
 
Barriers to effective information sharing perceived by research participants 
 One of the critical issues for all agencies is that of mental health. There are embedded 
confidentiality clauses in health legislation that govern the treatment of clients, and 
clinicians think these clauses over-ride Principle 11 of the Privacy Act. In some cases, 
wrong assessments are made by professionals because of a lack of knowledge in this 
area. Information sharing would enhance service to the client and improve safety to the 
community. 
 If a person spends less than two years in prison they are often not provided with 
rehabilitation programmes. Their release time is a high risk time, but release details are 
not shared with Police.  Section 50 of the Parole Act requires Corrections to inform 
Police when prisoners are released, not beforehand. Therefore, Police get no advanced 
warning. 
 Personality issues can be barriers to information sharing. For example, individuals with 
strong personalities wanted to work together, but couldn’t work well together as a team. 
A broker of power relationships needed to be brought in. 
 The biggest barrier to information sharing would be sudden changes in personalities in 
the job.  POI needs continuous relationship building. Once these relationships are 
broken it is hard and time-consuming to get the initiative back on track. 
 Inconsistent representation at management meetings means information is not shared 
evenly across all agencies. Information between working group and management group 
can be fragmented when presented to the governance group, and vice versa. 
 A joint paper-file is kept, but because of breakdown in trust between the workers, this 
file does not necessarily accurately reflect information available within the agencies. 
 Timeliness of information flow is a frustration. Getting officials together can be difficult. 
 More time is required to enable managers to focus on these offenders. At the moment it 
is done amongst other duties. An inter-agency liaison person would be helpful. It 
needn’t be a Police officer. Their relationship with offenders is not necessarily 
conducive to co-operation. 
 Sharing information is only one part of the puzzle. Bringing people from different 
agencies together to work on specific projects when at the local level staffing is 
determined for specific outcomes, is difficult to achieve. Regional specifications are so 
tight that the ability of individual agencies to contribute to something different is 
almost non-existent. Government agencies should be looking to re-create/ re-
conceptualise how staff are deployed at the local level. 
 Staff live in a world of ambiguity where the boundaries are unclear. Managers struggle 
to understand what is appropriate and this makes it very hard on staff actually doing the 
job. It is hard for people from different organisations to work together as a team when 
all around them (management, technology, equipment etc) says they are not. 
 No-one wants to give up resources to accommodate [Head Office devised] joint 
initiatives because local resources are so scarce. MSD has the most flexibility. There is 
scrutiny from H/O and MPs because they want joint outcomes, but they are also very 
risk averse so it is very hard for some of these initiatives to operate because they are 
working on very risky ground. 
 The central support from H/O in terms of providing funding, resources and 
management of the political pressure is not forthcoming. There is no sense of direction 
from the centre. Regional managers have the imperative to make inter-agency 
initiatives work, but there is a high investment with not much outcome. 
 It gets too hard without central direction. There is no level of autonomous decision-
making to do particular things. Each Regional Manager is likely to get into trouble for 
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 Legal people in each agency, especially in relation to information sharing and privacy, 
need to be talking off the same page: there are different interpretations of the Privacy 
Act coming from different H/Os. Which interpretation needs to prevail in cross-agency 
collaborations? 
 It is difficult when an external group (e.g. members of a local marae) is not privy to the 
privacy consent that the individual has signed as part of the process. Individuals may 
give separate consent for externals to be involved for specific purposes only. 
 There are problems around storage and ownership of shared information. For instance, 
how does information get stored when staff are co-located but come from different 
agencies? Does each person carry their own memory sticks: where does that 
information get stored? How do Police, Probation, or any other agency personnel 
access their own databases when they are in an MSD building, and possibly using MSD 
equipment? 
 The original family trees [that the initiative is based on] are not being updated and 
monitored. 
 
 
Enablers of information sharing perceived by research participants 
 Trust in relationships and relationships building between agencies is crucial. 
 The initiative could use a shared database contributed to by different agencies. Access 
could be covered by protocols and authorities. 
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Case Study Area 5: Electronic Monitored Bail (EM Bail) 
 
Programme Short description 
Electronic Monitored Bail 
(EM Bail) 
 
 Ankle bracelet monitoring system for persons awaiting 
trials. Purpose is to reduce the number of people held in 
prisons prior to trials taking place. 
 NZ Police personnel assess applications for EMBail by 
individuals awaiting trial.   
 Liaison takes place with Housing NZ, MSD, CYF, Health, 
employers, and Work & Income to assess whether a person 
is safe to be released into the community and how the bail 
conditions will be met. 
 Types of information shared include offending history, 
personal details and service needs. 
 Approximately 120 people are currently on the programme 
       and it is operating in every Police District in New Zealand. 
 
 
 
Background 
EM Bail is applied for by remand prisoners wishing to spend their pre-trial period at home with 
electronic monitoring. This allows “eligible defendants to live at home or an approved community 
address, wearing an electronic bracelet as part of their bail conditions” (FAQ – NZ Police 
website).  The electronic bracelet sends a continuous signal to a monitoring unit linked to a 
control centre which monitors and records the person’s movements 24 hours a day. EM Bail does 
not stop the person leaving the designated area, but if their departure is not pre-approved an alarm 
is raised which is responded to by Police.  
  
Authorisation is given to NZ Police by the applicant via a signed consent form to carry out 
comprehensive checks on the individual to ascertain their suitability for the programme. Police act 
as the single point of assessment, but obtain and share information on the individual from a broad 
range of agencies and individuals within the community (e.g. employers, family members). The 
information received is used to compile a report for consideration by the Court on the suitability 
of an applicant to remain at home until their court hearing. Fifteen working days is allowed for 
information gathering, site visit and the presentation of a report to the Court. 
 
In granting bail a Judge has to take into account the likelihood of further offending, absconding, 
interference with witnesses, the seriousness of current offence, previous record and behaviour, and 
the safety of residents, applicant, victims and the community (s. 8(1)–(3) Bail Act). EM Bail 
Assessors (i.e. Police personnel) have to present a balanced risk assessment of the likelihood of 
any of these events occurring and provide the Judge with evidence based information where 
possible. Currently the national policy is that if a ‘significant risk’ can be demonstrated then the 
applicant remains in custody.   
  
Once a person has been granted EM Bail by the Court, the Bail Assessors have responsibility for 
arranging the process. The electronic bracelets are supplied and monitored by a private company 
(CHUBB). The EM Bail Assessors have responsibility for monitoring all pre-authorised leaves of 
absence from the premises (e.g. medical appointments; education or employment arrangements).  
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Information needs and requirements 
 At the moment, agencies receiving information requests are responding according to 
their perception of what is needed. 
 Priority is about getting information that enables an assessment of the safety and the 
security of the placement, not about re-offending. 
 A technical assessment is carried out to ascertain if a signal is available. That is, can the 
electronic process be physically put into place? 
 National statistics on the programme are collated and distributed on a weekly basis to 
“everyone who has an interest”. This summary is provided on a spreadsheet and 
distributed via email. It is used by management staff to identify pressure points in the 
district and ensure resources are appropriately distributed. Once a year, the information 
is collated into an annual report. 
 Internal communication is an issue. In smaller areas, there is a weekly update for 
station staff and a District roundup / briefing on application processing; EM Bail 
breaches; terminations. In bigger districts, this is not practical. Even if it was put on the 
District Bulleting Board, it may not be read. 
 
 
Information sharing practices and procedures 
 
 Principle 11 of the Privacy Act authorises sharing of information for safety and security 
of the community.  Managing risk is the full purpose of sharing information on this 
programme. 
 It is a judgment call about information that can be shared. There is a mixture of 
information the Assessors are obliged to share with particular people (e.g. current/past 
offending history with the other occupants of the residence) and what people need to 
know. Assessors are very conscious / sensitive about releasing information on a ‘need 
to know’ basis without compromising the privacy of the bail applicant. 
 Assessors are given two types of information: (i) ‘we will tell you this, but you can’t 
use it’, and (ii) ‘we will tell you this and you can use it in your report’. Some 
information cannot be reflected in the way it was delivered without losing the 
importance of the content. Assessors try to protect people, but also to provide facts for 
the Judge. “There is a difference between ‘evidence’ without knowledge, and 
‘knowledge’ without evidence about someone’s circumstances.  Assessors have to make 
judgments about what can be provided in official documents”. Recorded (‘hard’) 
information is done with a consciousness of how it will be used and who will see it. 
 As a general rule, the less formal, the fewer restrictions there are on sharing by 
individuals. The more formal it is, the more risk aversion there is. People have to check 
at their own end what can and cannot be shared. Everyone is initially cautious. No one 
wants to be responsible for sharing information they are not legally allowed to. Most 
agencies are conscious of their responsibilities under the Privacy Act. There is also a 
strong fear of being caught and being subject to retribution from individuals and 
organisations. 
 In some cases, some information is shared on trust that it will be used appropriately. 
People do not have the authority, but share anyway. There is quite a bit of “off the 
record” chat.  
 Facts do not always add up and make sense. Some information is not relevant to the 
bail application but is still relevant for an individual’s personal safety. For example, 
Probation informed the Bail Assessor in one case that “we had to change his Probation 
Officer because he was making sexual passes at her”. Such information allows the Bail 
Assessor to make a judgment about the safety of other people who may be sharing the 
residence with the applicant.  
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 Assessors do not speak to the applicant at any stage of the process.  
 An application includes a consent form signed by the applicant for Police to gather 
information from a broad range of informants including City Council, Court (Judge’s 
notes), Prison, Community Probation and Psychological Services, nominated health 
providers, training facilities and/or schools, rehabilitation and/or reintegration facilities, 
employers, residence facilities as well as Housing NZ, CYF and Work & Income.  
 All applications go to the EM Bail Programme Manager in each Police area and they 
are then distributed to the Assessors in the district. Final sign-off on the reports is made 
by Area Managers before they are sent back to the Courts. 
 The information gathering process is a standard desk-file process. Each step has 
process forms (template) which are faxed to agencies for completion. Information 
requests are sent along with a copy of the signed consent form.  
 Much of the material gathered is by means of staff from relevant organisations filling 
out templates requesting information on the applicant. Most external agencies respond 
reasonably well once they understand what it is about. Some home visits and/ or face-
to-face meetings are carried out with family members and employers.  It is in the best 
interests of employers to share information therefore they are usually very cooperative. 
 Each organisation has to interrogate their databases. Sometimes Assessors get the 
wrong information. Information needs have to be re-clarified and the information 
double checked. 
 In lots of cases the information gathering process depends on personal relationship 
management. Some agencies have individuals who are brilliant at assisting with the 
monitoring process. For example, WELTECH has set up a contact person who has a 
direct line to the EM Bail Assessor and provides information as required. CareNZ 
sends notes of attendance to the Bail Assessor as a matter of course. 
 An on-site assessment is made of the premises where the applicant intends to live and 
the residents there are interviewed. This enables the assessor to make a judgment about 
the suitability of the living arrangements, but also provides them with an opportunity to 
ensure that the people who will be living with the applicant, are aware of any issues 
relating to the applicant and his/her social circumstances. 
 Assessors need to provide information to the occupants on the EM Bail programme and 
what it means. They may also share information on the nature (but not the details) of 
the current offence and the applicant’s offending history so that the occupants are fully 
informed before giving their consent (by signature) to the process.  
 Assessors are careful about what is divulged and to what extent. The ‘need to know’ 
judgment is used as a rule, based on the need for safety. Usually Assessors ask people 
to “tell me what you know”. They will then add or correct information if necessary. 
Assessors are aware of their personal accountability for what is revealed. 
 Occupants of a residence can be hesitant at first: “Once you set out the ground rules of 
confidentiality they are more relaxed, and the more they tell you. If there is something 
to hide you soon pick up on it.” 
 EM Bail Assessors end up being social workers – trying to liaise with government 
agencies to ensure that the conditions of the bail are put into place. Variations to bail 
conditions go through lawyers but can fall back on Assessors although it is not 
technically part of their job. 
 A degree of chase-up is accepted because of the processes that are currently in place.  
Delays are part of systemic issues. 
 Assessors cross-check with Intelligence section before making site visits. They need 
softer knowledge about any operations underway: a heads up is needed for personal 
safety. For example, it is wise not to visit sites alone on the first occasion until you 
know what you are getting into. Go with other Bail Assessors or front-line staff. 
 Private organisations are generally very quick in providing information and often 
provide more than is required. This is because the Police are regarded as official agents 
and a trusted source. 
52  
 If an agency opposes the application, they are more likely to commit it to writing.  
Less is written if there are no concerns. 
 During monitoring and/or if additional relevant information is found out (e.g. 
psychological history), there is an opportunity to seek an early Court hearing and return 
or revoke an EM Bail provision. 
 Administrative requirements at each end of the process cut the actual time for gathering 
information down to 10 days actual time (e.g. management sign-off; reports have to be 
back in the Court 2 days prior to the hearing). 
 
   
Information gaps and fragmentation 
 Requests are standardised nationally (i.e. via template) but there is no national process 
between agencies for the information gathering process. 
 Sometimes it is difficult to work out with some agencies, which Service Centre (e.g. 
Community Probation) does what. They are separated according to an internal system 
that is not immediately apparent to the external person. It is difficult to figure out 
whom to ask for the information required.  
 Some Police are unaware that EM Bail is run by the Police. In big geographical areas it 
is hard to get proper internal information. People associate EM Bail with Home 
Detention run by Community Probation. The differentiation is not being understood 
internally. Even the Communications section always need to be told it is a Police run 
programme. 
 The monitoring role also contributes to the perception that EM Bail Assessors are not 
Police personnel. The Communications Centre staff members sometimes hold 
information on breaches over for the weekend to be referred to Community Probation 
even though it is the Police who are supposed to respond immediately. The only 
operational duty Police have is to attend to breach notifications. Once breaches have 
occurred it goes straight back to Court and is no longer a Police issue. 
 Front-line Police and EM Bail Assessors have different expectations about who 
monitors the bail applicants and why (e.g. who makes the decision to arrest for 
breach?). 
 There are boundaries around official information sets which mean that different 
professionals know different things that may have a substantive impact on the final 
report. For example, CYF may have no issues with an address (i.e. they are not aware 
of any offences against children occurring at that address) and formally sign-off on 
approval of the bail application.  However, the offender may have a previous history of 
domestic violence in front of children and therefore may not be suitable for placement 
in a household with children. If CYF had been aware of this information they may have 
changed their approval recommendation.  
 CYF identifies risks to children in the residence based on historical records. The 
current offence is not relevant unless it directly involves the children. 
 Current recorded data does not carry the level of detail needed to provide relevant links 
and tie it all together. For example, who acted for the person at the EM Bail hearing? 
Moreover, what were proposed addresses, or information about social circumstances? 
Incomplete or incorrect information can have knock-on effects for the bail applicant, 
victims, family, or other members of the community.  
 More detailed information sets from agencies are required to formulate a factual report 
to the Court:  “Yes, it’s fine and feasible” doesn’t help. 
 If information about an address cannot be checked (because residents cannot be 
contacted on site) the Court and the applicant’s lawyers are advised and a request is 
made for another Court date for a different address. There is no feedback loop on this 
event. 
 Not all agencies are responsive to the information gathering process. In some cases, 
internal processes are complicated and this results in non-performance and/or there is a 
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 Agencies work on the basis of different information sets and requirements. For 
example, quite often the information that comes back from Housing NZ cannot be used 
by Assessors. There is a requirement that they be notified, but a lot of the information 
they supply is not relevant to the EM Bail application. The Housing NZ view of who 
they want living in their residences is irrelevant to the application unless it has a legal 
basis (i.e. in the Housing Act). It is not their decision, and unless there is some 
regulatory or legal impediment to the applicant residing in one of their properties, their 
input is not helpful.  
 There is limited contact between Assessors. As a result, opportunities for learning 
transfers are restricted.  
 Local practice varies from national standards (e.g. protocols surrounding site visits). 
 If a bail applicant is living in the Hutt but the charges are in Wellington there is a 
problem. All variations in the conditions of the bail arrangements have to be physically 
dealt with in the Wellington office because the Hutt staff refuse to deal with Wellington 
cases. By contrast, Auckland central Bail Assessors report that if the planned address of 
the bail applicant is outside of the Auckland central district it is dealt with by the local 
Bail Assessment team and reported back to Auckland central.  
 There are problems getting information within the very short time frame required for 
the EM Bail application process (15 working days). External organisations do not meet 
the required timeframes and Assessors spend a lot of time chasing up for information. 
 Both the quality and quantity of information possible to obtain is compromised by tight 
timeframes. There is pressure from lawyers for ‘quick hits’. 
 Probation Officers can be “too busy to talk to you”, which leads to more work for the 
Assessors. They are bound by other people’s processes. EM Bail can’t dictate other 
organisations timeframes and they may not care about Police/Courts timeframes. There 
are often apologies because people are overworked and the information requirements 
have been overlooked under other priorities. 
 If information from agencies is not forthcoming in the timeframe available the only 
choice Assessors have is to advise the Court that “whilst reports were requested, they 
have not been received”.  No advice can be proffered without information. If 
information is important and Bail Assessors have been advised of a specific hold-up 
they may seek an adjournment from the Court.  This is a particular problem too with 
Judge’s notes. Judges won’t make decisions without checking their previous notes, 
but if these are not made available to the Assessors by the Courts, they cannot be 
included. 
 Courts reply to requests eventually but not in a timely manner. There is trouble locating 
files between offices of the Court. Similarly with information from the prisons. 
Sometimes information doesn’t come at all and sometimes it comes too late. 
Information received may not be relevant, but you cannot say it won’t be useful if you 
do not have it. 
 Sometimes it is hard to get hold of the Criminal Court Registrars as they are especially 
busy. 
 Risks to the applicants are advised to the Court, but not necessarily to other people 
interviewed. 
 Variations in practice between local districts are not transparent and poor information 
transfer about changes in process (e.g. Court adjournments) can create inefficiencies. 
 The ‘business reports’ generated as a sub-programme of the mainframe do not deliver a 
national picture and report the types of data required by politicians and the media (e.g. 
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 Probation also uses electronic equipment and has a monitoring relationship with the 
same company. CHUBB reports indicate that another anklet (HD) is on the site, but 
will not provide details. Liaison has to take place to check violations. The privacy 
emphasis is on the provider. 
 
 
Treatment of sensitive information 
 Regardless of the agency – if there is a personal safety issue professionals feel a moral 
obligation to ensure other workers are safe. For example, being warned that there is 
someone with HIV who is a ‘spitter’. 
 There is no avenue to share some confidential information; therefore it is shared within 
‘professional confidence’. Informant information sometimes cannot be acted upon 
although it is relevant because it cannot be ‘proved’. 
 There are no rules to allow for the sharing of personal information so workers ‘work 
around’ it at the risk of getting into trouble for it. Assessors work in a world where 
confidential / private information is known, but can only be used in a limited way. 
 Potential concerns about privacy are offset by the applicant’s signed consent to the 
programme. However, if lawyers cross out authorisation of particular sections of the 
assessment (quoting privacy or contributing to investigation at a later stage), then the 
assessment cannot be completed and the Assessor has no choice but to advise the Court 
of that. 
 Information sharing on individuals is very rare at the national level. It is usually not 
necessary to do the jobs required at that level. The application form authorises 
operational people to check information, and to give out information to agencies. There 
is a question as to whether this level of authorisation is necessary for this programme. 
Exemption provisions may enable information sharing anyway.  
 There are difficulties with getting information from health providers because of 
confidentiality and privacy concerns. The EM Bail Assessors are not interested in the 
person’s health matters, but they do need to know if the person has physically turned up 
for an appointment and when they leave the premises. They also need to know any 
associated care needs that will impact on the person’s bail conditions (e.g. need to 
attend out-patient clinics for regular treatment, or one-off treatments). The best practice 
is to make contact with a particular person in the doctor’s office and establish a 
professional relationship. If they understand the programme they will assist and the 
monitoring process runs well. 
 There is a major problem for Assessors to obtain mental health information needed to 
explore whether treatment or care requirements can affect ongoing monitoring or 
physical care arrangements. Mental health providers are very reluctant to provide that 
information. Front-line staff need internal permissions to release information.  
 
 
ICT infrastructure, applications, skills and knowledge 
 EM Bail is one of the initiatives in a broader sector strategy around effective 
interventions.  Although data on the programme is shared with the Ministry of Justice, 
the Case Management System (CMS – MoJ system) does not record the depth of data 
needed for Police to manage the business.  Police are creating an increasingly large 
spreadsheet with more detailed data. The long-term intention is to get the information 
into the Police computer system, but there are other technical priorities at this time for 
Police. 
 Assessors have no access to databases of other agencies.  
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 Access to internal electronic systems is not a problem, but there is no way of knowing if 
the data is up to date or reliable, or even still relevant. Summary of facts and other case 
material may be incomplete. Victim impact reports are on the physical file, but may not 
yet be on the electronic file.   
 Access to information from Police personnel is problematic because of a lack of 
understanding of the programme. 
 
 
Barriers to effective information sharing perceived by research participants 
 The single biggest barrier is a lack of understanding of the programme. People need to 
know it is a Police operated programme and a pre-trial process: therefore, it won’t 
affect the outcome of the subsequent Court process. There is a lack of knowledge about 
the difference between Home Detention (HD) and EM Bail. For example, Work & 
Income staff assume that (as in HD) an offender can attend their office at the Probation 
Officer’s discretion. However, this is not the case with EM Bail. Unless it is already 
known that an offender has to attend a Work & Income appointment, they are not free 
to go to the office. Any variation to the bail conditions has to be made by a Judge. 
Consequently, this has to go back to Court and this takes time:  “It is a constant battle 
to educate Work & Income about something that is not part of their core business”. 
 It can be difficult getting hold of the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the case, especially if 
they are at Constable level and often not in the office. They can be on different shifts, 
or on leave.  Sometimes they have a perception that the EM Bail Assessors are from 
Community Probation, and they won’t co-operate with them. Often the OIC won’t 
return phone calls or respond to emails (even when it is apparent it is from an internal 
email address). They have no ‘out of office’ details and simply do not respond. This is 
particularly an issue if they oppose bail and they believe that the EM Bail Assessors are 
working against all of the work they have already put in. 
 There is a perception by some Police staff that Probation staff are not professional. 
They have no trust that ‘their’ information is going to be safe and therefore they do not 
co-operate with them. 
 If Police evidence is strong for an offence, and they have a view of the offender and the 
appropriateness of EM Bail, this is important to share with the Bail Assessors. 
However, Police see the process as one that undoes all of their hard work and therefore 
are reluctant to share important information. The Police Prosecutions section work hard 
to ensure a person is put in custodial remand in the first place; therefore, there is an 
internal conflict of interests between staff within the same division.   
 There is hesitancy on the part of officials to get ‘caught up’ if information is 
formalised. For example, CYF personnel may get called to Court to discuss information 
they may have provided for the assessment.  
 EM Bail has no legislative status. It needs a more legal standing: for instance, enquiry 
forms are only guidelines; they are not compulsory and some agencies only respond to 
them on a discretionary basis. The checks and balances in the process are not adequate. 
 Difficulties in obtaining information are a result of (i) work overload, (ii) ego – do not 
want to share information or ‘ownership’ over information sets: too important to share, 
(iii) different interpretations by different professionals, (iv) the profile of EM Bail is 
blurry and not strong in definition. 
 Information sharing between agencies is not addressed in specific legislation to 
streamline processes. 
 
 
Enablers of information sharing perceived by research participants 
 In the longer term, the programme needs to specify more clearly what information is 
needed. For example, Housing NZ’s ‘opinion’ of the placement is not required, or 
important to the final report. What is required is information about whether the 
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 Information request forms need to be more specific about what each agency needs to 
contribute.  For example, CYF needs to be asked to check the address; check the 
offender; and match the information against each other to give an accurate risk 
assessment. 
 The process works most efficiently when each agency has a central point of contact, 
and a person to work with. 
 Work & Income (Steps to Freedom) set up processes between one person and the Bail 
Assessor.  This saves management issues and ensures that barriers to providing bail 
applicants with income support are overcome. The Work & Income processes tend to 
be inflexible, which doesn’t accommodate the programme and leads to greater 
compliance complications. Different areas approach it differently. 
 Even if Assessors could view databases of other agencies, but not have authority to 
change them, it would save time and reduce duplication of information and effort. 
 Access to broader information sets would reduce the need for human judgment factors 
that multiply across information sharing processes. 

5. Cross case study analysis 
 
The case studies examined in this research varied widely in their purpose, the agencies 
involved, and the information sharing arrangements used. They were similar only insofar 
as each was working with clients with multiple and often complex problems, the 
resolution of which required input from a range of government and non-government 
agencies. Across the case studies however, the following ‘patterns’ of research findings 
could be observed: 
 
 
Information is shared on a ‘need to know’ basis  
Across the case studies we could observe that information sharing between professionals 
of different agencies is happening, albeit not in an open or unrestricted way: information 
is shared on a ‘need to know’ basis and justified in terms of ensuring that people know 
enough to do their jobs effectively and safely. Professionals are conscious about the need 
to protect personal information, but apply ‘common sense’ in cases where that protection 
of personal information might stand in the way of the protection of professional, personal 
or community safety. In those cases, abstracted information is often used to alert other 
professionals about the need to further investigate a particular client. 
 
 
Information sharing is strongly related to trust in relationships with other professionals: 
without that trust, information is not shared. 
All case studies provide strong evidence for the fact that information sharing is related to 
the trust that a person giving the information has in the person receiving the information 
to treat it professionally and use it judiciously. Without that trust, information is not 
shared. That is, the professional role or organisational status of the individual (e.g. Police 
Officer, Team Leader, Case Worker etc) will not necessarily ensure that relevant 
information is passed on to another professional from a different agency, or even to a 
colleague from the same organisational unit. For instance, if other professionals do not 
trust that individual, based on either their professional behaviour (e.g. has displayed poor 
judgment in the past) or their organisational status (e.g. a Probation Officer and therefore 
an outsider to the Police), then information is with-held or presented in a minimalist way. 
Examples of this include the difficulties EM Bail staff have in obtaining case information 
from Police Case Officers: they are perceived to be working for the Probation Service and 
are therefore ‘outsiders’ and not entitled to ‘police’ information. Under the POI 
programme, this was also demonstrated when some of the case workers expressed no-
confidence in their CPPS colleague and therefore did not share information with her 
unless absolutely necessary. 
 
On the other hand, where professional trust is high, professionals with different mandates 
(e.g. Police, Work & Income staff, Probation officers) share information openly and 
beyond that which is required by the official parameters of their specific job. With that, 
we may conclude that the quality of information sharing depends on the quality of 
relationships between individual professionals. However, we can also observe that the 
quality and quantity of information sharing between professionals from different agencies 
is further increased when there is a clear commitment to a shared outcome (e.g. POI in 
Papakura; HR/HP initiative in Christchurch).  
 
 
Professionals use different information sets according to their core business needs  
Information relevant to achieving the shared outcomes being sought in the initiatives 
under study is not homogeneous in nature, but involves a wide variation in information 
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needs of different agencies as well as different policy sector-related information sets. For 
example, Work & Income may only need to know a person’s current status in relation to a 
range of variables, such as marital status, number of dependent children, current address, 
and/or offending record (i.e. have they recently been released from prison?), in order to 
establish their eligibility for specific benefits. For other agencies, such as Police, CYF or 
those providing health services, alterations to an individual’s status and living 
arrangements over time may be important to assess their level of current need, relevancy 
of services, or the degree of risk they pose to others depending on the circumstances of 
the interaction. 
 
 
Professionals use different interpretations of ‘valid’ information 
The fact that agencies have different information needs and requirements also leads to a 
situation in which different information sets are regarded as ‘valid’ by officials from 
different agencies, affecting how information is processed and used. Officials make 
decisions about the validity of information and therefore what they can act on, and what is 
disregarded as unnecessary to the completion of their duties. For example, a Probation 
Officer may have to decide whether ‘intelligence’ information that a particular residence 
is being operated as a ‘P’ house is relevant in the absence of hard corroborating evidence 
and therefore can be taken into consideration in assessing the suitability of that address for 
placement of an offender on parole.  Similarly, a Work and Income official may not 
regard previous criminal offending relevant to making an assessment about current benefit 
eligibility.   
 
Such judgments to act upon, or not act upon ‘invalidated’ information have implications 
for officials and/or the community. If information is irrelevant to the mandate of a 
particular official do they need to have access to it, or take it into account? Is there any 
ethical imperative to do so over and above the operational technicalities of their official 
task? Where different officials are co-located and working towards the same outcome 
what are the boundaries relating to information sharing where different participants have 
different information needs? The resolution of these questions can be critical to the 
quality of service delivery and to the practical implementation of official’s ‘duty of care’ 
to individuals and the communities which they serve. 
 
Furthermore, there can be situations in which officials and their clients have different 
interpretations of the agency’s information needs and requirements. For example, in the 
case of the Refugee Service Organisations, we could observe that information 
requirements of government agencies clash with the cultural norms of refugees. This 
particular example reveals that who does what with the information, is as important as the 
information itself. 
 
 
Signed consent forms are used by professionals as authorisation to share information 
All of the case studies we examined have clear documented processes whereby individual 
clients consent to particular sets of information being shared across agencies and amongst 
professional groups. These consent forms vary in detail and depth. For example, the EM 
Bail applicants sign consent forms that enable Police Assessors access to a wide range of 
personal information, and enable them to share that personal information with other 
officials and people nominated by the applicant. On the other hand, the consent forms 
used by agencies providing services to refugees are very broad and general. In all cases, 
signed consent forms are used by officials (government and non-government) as 
authorisation to share information on the client’s behalf, and to share information about 
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clients with other professionals (and in some cases people associated with the client) as 
necessary to achieve their organisational goals. 
 
 
Professionals make a distinction between formal or ‘hard’ information and informal or 
‘soft’ information 
Across the case studies we could observe that front-line staff make a clear distinction 
between the following types of information:  
 
 Formal or ‘hard’ information – that which is written and exchanged through formal 
processes between different professionals, between professionals and their clients, and 
between officials from different organisations (e.g. exchange of papers, fax, emails, 
templated information held on a database). Often, formal information is reduced to 
core facts with little associated substantiating evidence. 
 
 Informal or ‘soft’ information – that which is unwritten and exchanged usually 
directly between professionals (either individually or in groups) but is neither 
recorded nor in many cases acknowledged as valid or verifiable evidence but 
nevertheless constitutes part of the knowledge base a professional has. Informal 
information is acted upon as ‘real’ information. 
    
Front-line officials therefore operate in a situation in which they not only are making 
judgments about the validity of information, but also are assessing whether they can use 
that information officially, or if they can act on it unofficially. Moreover, they make 
judgments about what information can be shared with whom, and for what purpose. In 
this respect, respondents indicated that a clear distinction is made by officials between 
information that can be committed to writing as part of the ‘official record’ and 
information that can be acted upon. As one respondent further explained: “there is a 
difference between ‘evidence’ without knowledge, and ‘knowledge’ without evidence 
about someone’s circumstances. Staff have to make judgments about what can be 
provided in official documents”.   
 
There is evidence from several of the case studies that professionals are exceedingly 
particular about what is officially recorded with respect to any individual, and there is 
every likelihood that the written record only constitutes a small percentage of what 
officials ‘know’ about an individual and/or about a situation. It is the combination of 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ information which forms the basis for professional judgments about 
operational practices on a daily basis. 
 
 
Professionals relied more heavily on ‘soft’ information 
Officials indicated a particular awareness of how official records can be, and often are, 
used by different parties for different reasons (e.g. lawyers, media, and in some cases the 
clients themselves). In this respect, several professionals indicated that they rely more 
heavily on the ‘soft’ information or “what we know” as opposed to the official record. 
There was a clear indication from the interviewees that this approach provide a number of 
distinct advantages to officials with respect to their personal and professional ‘safety’ and 
the safety of other people.  
 
 
Professionals ensure that colleagues know enough to do their jobs safely and effectively 
Across the case studies there is strong evidence of an implicit professional code amongst 
officials relating to the protection of professional, personal or community safety. This 
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professional code of safety protection operates in both formal and informal processes and 
is extended to other service providers (government and non-government) and members of 
the community. For example, an agency providing residency for prisoners on their release 
may be informally alerted to possible issues that may affect the safety of their staff or 
other residents. Similarly, as part of the formal suitability assessment process, EM Bail 
staff ensure that other residents in a property where a person will reside while on bail, are 
aware of any previous offending before they give their consent for the person to be 
released to that address, so that they are making an informed decision (albeit without 
supporting details). A further example is when a person has a mental health problem and 
the details of this problem cannot be shared with other officials, the health professional 
concerned may indicate to other staff (e.g. prison staff, case workers) that the individual 
needs a particular medication regime, thereby signalling to staff that this client has a 
different set of needs compared to other people they are dealing with.  
 
For those agencies working under a public safety mandate, where community, 
professional and personal safety is a paramount issue in an operational sense, respondents 
indicated that they see ‘Principle 11’ of the Privacy Act, 1993 as enabling them to share 
critical information with other professionals and, with that, as the embodiment of this 
professional code. While Principle 11 was regarded by respondents as enabling them to 
share critical information, they were also clear that this is only done on a ‘need to know’ 
basis amongst professionals attempting to achieve the same outcomes. In this respect 
information sharing that included personal data of individuals, is not seen as a violation of 
privacy but as something what has to be done to ‘do the job effectively’. In other words, 
there was a view that some jobs involve the sharing of personal details in order to do these 
jobs effectively. Privacy was not regarded as being violated by personal information being 
shared with officials who have a role in relation to that person. 
 
For agencies working under a public service mandate, where public safety is not dominant 
in an operational sense and therefore Principle 11 of the Privacy Act, 1993 was not 
applicable, we observed that the same implicit professional code of safety protection is 
applied amongst officials. Although, in principle, personal information on the client is 
confidential, this principle may very well be ignored if the staff member judges that there 
are professional, personal or community safety risks: in those cases, critical information is 
shared with other professionals on a ‘need to know’ basis. For example, a Work & 
Income assessor is aware that a client displaying problematic behaviour as a result of a 
drinking problem is on his way to another agency and informs a representative of that 
agency that a client with a health-related issue will arrive with them soon. Several 
respondents explained that, from their perspective, ‘common sense needs to prevail’ in 
these situations. Acknowledging that there may not be a legal back-up for their decision, 
one interviewee further clarified: “If staff break the law, they do it for the right reasons”. 
 
In general, interviewees indicated that they do not ‘gossip’ about their clients, but neither 
will they allow other staff to unknowingly be put into positions that constitute a risk to 
that person.  
 
 
There are clear differences in information sharing practice and procedure between 
agencies with a public safety mandate, and agencies with a public service mandate 
Where agencies with a public safety mandate use Principle 11 of the Privacy Act, 1993, 
for sharing critical information with other organisations, agencies operating under a 
public service mandate do not have such a legal ‘back-up’. For agencies with a public 
service mandate, this leads to unclear situations of where the (legal) boundaries are with 
respect to the sharing of critical information with other agencies. This applies to the 
sharing of critical information both with agencies operating under a public safety 
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mandate, and with agencies with a public service mandate. As public service staff 
experience uncertainty about whether, and if so what information can be shared, the 
default position of staff is not to share information.  
 
This default position of not sharing information leads to situations where there is no 
sharing of ‘intelligence’ between agencies (e.g. between Refugee Service organisations 
about shared clients; between Corrections and Work & Income about system ‘rip offs’ in 
the area of income support); or where agencies focused on their own agenda are not 
meeting the holistic needs of the client, which, from a client’s perspective, can lead to 
flow-on complications with other parts of the system (e.g. in the case of refugees: not 
meeting eligibility criteria for income support has implications for housing). 
 
In cases where critical information sharing is not happening, professionals are sometimes 
being exposed to danger without their knowledge (e.g. a female official from a service 
providing organisation not knowing that an inmate has a criminal history of assault on 
female officers). 
 
In the case of the Linwood Service Centre, the default position of not sharing information 
and the lack of a legal back-up for sharing critical information leads to a situation where 
clients need to join-up service providers, so that their complex needs are being met: as 
clients need to pass on the referral form to the agency concerned, they control the 
information provided to the various partner organisations in the Integrated Service 
Response initiative. 
 
As a result of consistently using signed consent forms as an authorisation from the client 
to share information on their behalf, several respondents indicated that issues around 
privacy protection are not so much emerging in relationships with clients, but in 
relationships between organisations. For instance, due to perceived risks in decision 
making around privacy legislation, public service staff are often overcautious with 
applying the Privacy Act in relationships between organisations and therefore not wanting 
to share critical information. An interviewee observed that “the Privacy Act slows down 
quality services targeted at clients with complex needs and with the right intentions”. 
Some respondents also reported that staff hide behind the Privacy Act (HR/HP) as a 
reason for not doing something. 
 
 
There are strong boundaries around particular data sets, with strict protection by 
authorised personnel 
 Across the case studies we could observe that particular data sets, such as medical 
records and child protection records, have special protection: access to these data sets is 
only allowed for authorised personnel, i.e. professional experts in the area concerned. 
Moreover, certain sets of information, such as details of physical health, mental health or 
criminal histories, are bound by legal constraints and therefore are not shared even 
amongst professionals. These particular data sets are recognised by all professionals as 
outside of bounds, and there is no indication from any of the case studies that details of 
these records are ever subject to sharing. While all respondents were accepting of the need 
for strict privacy around personal health issues, this was also the area that was 
unanimously reported as posing substantial difficulties in an operational respect. 
 
 
Health information is not shared, but critical information in this area is often required to 
do a professional job 
Respondents reported that the difficulties obtaining medical information is the area in 
which they are most exposed, and in which safety issues for them personally and 
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professionally, and for members of the public are most likely to arise. For example, 
refugees experiencing various forms of post-traumatic stress disorder can pose problems 
to themselves, their families and members of the community as well as the professionals 
tasked with providing them with services and assistance. Without knowledge or 
information on the health-related factors involved in any given situation, officials are 
compromised in their ability to protect individual clients, members of the community, or 
even themselves.   
 
Interviewees also provided examples where health-related information was not shared 
between professionals, which compromised the individual from receiving services they 
were entitled to. For example, a refugee continuously missed appointments and when a 
home visit was carried out they turned out to be a double amputee whose physical ability 
to participate was compromised and who needed special support that the providing agency 
was unaware of. 
 
Furthermore, several respondents reported that many health practitioners were unwilling 
or unable to co-operate with other professional organisations (government or non-
government), citing the Privacy Act as a blanket barrier to information sharing even when 
there was no sharing of personal details about a client involved (e.g. did they attend an 
appointment). In this respect, information sharing practice was widely variable and 
depended almost entirely on the attitude of individual practitioners, the interpretation of 
local administrators as to how they should be applying the Privacy Act, 1993 (i.e. what 
information they could and could not share), and the ability of officials to build working 
relationships with other professionals and across agencies. There was no common 
understanding of how the Privacy Act, 1993, should be applied in these health-related 
information sharing instances across agencies, and no common practice.  
 
Respondents also noted that, as the health sector is fragmented and widely distributed, 
they were often unclear whom to invite to the table, or whom to contact in order to obtain 
information with respect to individual clients.   
 
 
Information sharing protocols are useful for establishing effective information sharing 
Respondents reported that having an information sharing protocol in place has helped to 
develop relationships with officials from other agencies and build trust. Moreover, 
compared to the situation prior to having the information sharing protocol, it has helped to 
bring officials from different agencies around the table. Another advantage of having an 
information sharing protocol is that it provides clarity to officials about how to interpret or 
apply legal provisions.  
 
In case studies where an information sharing protocol is in place, we observed that 
professionals treat each other as colleagues even when someone is employed by another 
agency – for the purpose of the initiative, they are treated as ‘honorary employees’ privy 
to the same information sets. For example, Police members participate in HR/HP 
meetings with Corrections staff and share information about inmates, as well as receive 
information. Similarly, the senior managers involved with the Papakura and Christchurch 
POI initiatives share agency-specific information across agency boundaries in the interests 
of ensuring that they make informed decisions as a group about the suitability of any 
individual for the programme. 
 
However, in the information sharing protocols under study, grey areas around information 
sharing with community-based service providers can be observed (e.g. NGOs). For 
example, government agencies often have formal information sharing protocols between 
them, but many other organisations assist with practical needs; it is unclear to 
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professionals concerned how much can be shared with these community-based service 
providers, and how the Privacy Act, 1993, can be interpreted around that. In the cases 
under study, a consent form often overcomes these problems.   
 
 
Co-location supports information sharing practice 
Several respondents reported that co-location enhances opportunities to develop 
relationships with other agencies, build trust amongst professionals and, with that, share 
information with other professionals, for instance in cases where there is no information 
sharing protocol in place. For example, at the Linwood Service Centre, co-location of 
government and non-government agencies means there is information available that 
otherwise would not have been shared between these groups: new shared records are 
being created which can be accessed by all agencies on site. Although these are paper-
based, the status and quality of these records is questionable: for instance, who ‘owns’ 
these records? Which agency (if any) has responsibility for managing them, ensuring their 
security and accuracy and/or ensuring they are covered by disaster recovery procedures?   
 
In general, there are serious questions about the completeness of records held on ‘co-
located’ sites, and their usefulness. For example, respondents indicated that Linwood 
Service Centre workers rely on processes of other agencies, such as filling out and signing 
of information sharing consent forms, without actually physically checking on the shared 
paper records that consent has been given. In the same vein, respondents pointed out that, 
under the POI initiative in Christchurch, because of a breakdown in trust between workers 
from different agencies, the records held on-site did not accurately reflect the information 
that is available to officials from their agency databases.     
 
 
Officials use manual ‘work-around’ techniques to compensate for a lack of technical 
interoperability of information systems, or no access allowed to personnel from other 
agencies 
Each agency has its own information storing process. Police, Corrections, Courts, Health, 
Work & Income, CYF, Education, and presumably other individual agencies, all have 
secured databases containing information on individuals pertinent to their own mandate. 
Access to these databases is restricted to agency personnel only. This not only implies that 
each agency has fragmented information relating to an individual, but also that officials 
use manual ‘work-around’ techniques to compensate for a lack of technical 
interoperability between information systems belonging to different agencies, or for the 
fact that access to these systems is not allowed to personnel from other agencies. These 
manual ‘work-around’ techniques involve duplication of data and data entry processes, as 
well as sending and receiving emails with sensitive data in attachments. For example, 
because Police personnel participating in the HR/HP initiative cannot access the 
Corrections Integrated Management of Offenders System (IOMS), relevant information is 
sent to them on excel spreadsheets, which they have to manually match against the Police 
databases. The spreadsheets are then updated in the spreadsheet manually by the Police 
and sent back to Corrections, where an administrator cuts and pastes the additional Police 
updates back into IOMS before the HR/HP meeting.   
 
Where officials from different agencies are co-located (e.g. POI Christchurch) paper-
based files are assembled because no shared database is available that personnel from a 
range of agencies can access. In other cases, shared databases have not yet been 
established for some initiatives, especially where cases are operating on a pilot basis. In a 
few initiatives, core information is shared via Excel spreadsheets (e.g. EM Bail). 
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Case study findings also indicate that some of the cumbersome information processing 
taking place is due to the lack of technical interoperability between government agencies, 
or between government and non-government agencies (e.g. Linwood Service Centre, POI, 
HR/HP, and Change Makers). This interoperability is partly an issue of incompatible 
operating systems (Linwood Service Centre, Change Makers), but in some cases it is 
directly related to information security issues (e.g. access restrictions) or issues around the 
ownership of information (e.g. ‘controlled’ databases). 
 
Technical solutions for improved information sharing are available, but unused  
In the majority of the case studies, technical solutions to the management of information 
sets across agencies were available, but unused. Explanations for this situation varied 
from officials being unaware of the technical support options available to them; agencies 
lacking the technical capability to explore and use technical solutions available to them; to 
a desire by some officials to ‘control’ information sets so that they could be sure of their 
validity and accuracy.  For example, Linwood Service Centre staff had designed their own 
‘shared workspace’ concept on paper and saw such a technical solution as highly 
desirable. However, there were significant difficulties in respect of base cost; the 
feasibility of cost contribution by different agencies; and in terms of the ability for other 
participating agencies (especially non-government) to meet the technical requirements.  
 
 
NGOs have substantial technical capability problems 
In several cases we could observe that non-government agencies in particular have no 
substantive investment in technical capability, or the means to improve that investment. A 
respondent from one of the refugee service agencies described the situation as follows 
“we don’t know what we don’t know. Our hardware systems are aged. We have no funds 
to hire people with any technical expertise, and we cannot prioritise technical training or 
systems or hardware upgrades with the limited funding we do have. Unless someone was 
willing to provide us time and expertise on a voluntary basis we just muddle along doing 
what we have always done”.  
 
 
Some agencies participating in information sharing initiatives are acting as ‘lead’ 
agencies with respect to information management 
Because issues of information security and technical information sharing options are not 
well understood there was evidence that some agencies are acting as ‘lead’ agencies with 
respect to information management. In some cases, this was the agency that has greater 
physical, financial, or technical resources available to manage the process (e.g. Police for 
the POI Papakura initiative; MSD for Linwood Service Centre; Corrections for the 
HR/HP initiative). This enables the lead agency to control formal data sets and ensure that 
data are used in ways that staff interpret as most appropriate for the shared outcome 
sought.   
 
 
Different government agencies have different interpretations of the Privacy Act, 1993, 
and how it should be applied 
Several respondents reported an operational barrier in applying the Privacy Act, 1993, in 
that different government (and in some cases non-government) agencies had different 
interpretations of the Act and how it should be applied. When agencies are working 
together these different interpretations proved to be a barrier. Specific support means, 
such as the Information Sharing Protocol developed for the POI initiative and 
promulgated across all of the agencies involved with the programme, were seen as very 
helpful. Respondents however indicated that this is one area that would benefit from a 
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common interpretation and clear, unambiguous instructions regarding operational 
implementation.   
 
 
‘Vertical’ information sharing practices between Head Office, local management 
structures and frontline operators are weaker than ‘horizontal’ inter-agency 
information sharing practices 
 
Officials who are working for different agencies, located within the same geographical 
area, and involved in managing shared outcomes, have stronger working relationships 
with a higher level of informal and formal information sharing, compared to colleagues 
working for the same agency but at different levels.   
 
For example, in one of the HR/HP case studies, front-line staff in both the Prison Service 
and the Community Probation Service indicated that they receive no information from the 
managers involved with the HR/HP forum process either about the initiative itself or 
about any related issues that might enable them to do their jobs better. Similarly, 
respondents involved in one of the POI case studies reported information gaps at both 
‘vertical’ ends of the management process. That is, case workers were not clearly 
informing management about operational issues, and the governance group decisions 
were not being clearly represented to the front-line workers. As a consequence, people 
involved in the same initiative at different levels (e.g. governance and front-line 
operations) have different perceptions about what the initiative is trying to achieve and 
how it should be operated. In some cases (e.g. EM Bail) this situation meant that the 
management support that might have included marketing, resource allocation and 
management, and relationship intervention to unblock intra- and inter-agency 
impediments to operational practices did not occur. 
 
However, in other case studies under the same programmes, staff from different agencies 
demonstrated high levels of informal and formal information sharing based on close 
working relationships that are characterised by trust and a clear commitment to a common 
outcome. In each of these cases, the management personnel effectively take personal 
responsibility for the success of the initiative and to a large degree either manage the 
operational procedures themselves (POI), or make sure that the required information is 
collated, and acted upon (HR/HP). 

6. International Information Sharing Solutions 
 
 
Introduction 
In countries with similar jurisdictions to New Zealand, such as the UK, Canada and 
Australia, opportunities for improving cross-agency information sharing to achieve more 
effective social outcomes for individuals and families at risk are being explored. In so-
doing solutions are being developed to overcome perceived tensions between goals of 
service transformation, and legal requirements to protect the privacy of individuals. In this 
chapter, we summarise information sharing approaches and solutions developed so far by 
the UK Central Government, the Canadian Federal Government and the Canadian 
Province of British Columbia, and the Australian Federal Government, respectively. In 
trying to identify opportunities for improved information sharing across agencies in the 
New Zealand context, a potential way forward for the NZ government could be to learn 
from these international approaches and arrangements. 
 
However, in comparing our New Zealand-based research findings with existing 
information sharing cultures, approaches and solutions in these three overseas 
jurisdictions, we would like to point to the following substantially different information 
sharing ‘realities’ in other countries compared to New Zealand. First of all, information 
sharing approaches and strategies in overseas jurisdictions under study are usually 
focused on promoting (more) information sharing between agencies, whereas our research 
findings for New Zealand show that information sharing (already) happens, but on a ‘need 
to know’ basis. Secondly, unlike the New Zealand situation, public officials in the UK, 
Canada or Australia do not know each other and (therefore) do not trust each other; as a 
result, there is hardly any development of informal relationships between agencies, and 
information exchanges between agencies are completely formalised. Moreover, agencies 
have strong ownership perceptions of information, leading to a default position for staff to 
not share information. These conditions in overseas jurisdictions lead to a situation where 
cross-government collaboration and managing for shared outcomes is much harder 
compared to the New Zealand context, and privacy legislation often is perceived as a 
barrier to (effective) information sharing practice. 
 
Below we describe more in detail the perspectives, approaches and information sharing 
solutions developed in the UK, Canada and Australia. 
 
 
United Kingdom 
UK Central Government 
In the UK, the general legal framework for cross-government information sharing is 
provided by the Data Protection Act 1998, the common law, and the European Union 
Data Protection Directive. Moreover, the Human Rights Act 1998 safeguards the right to 
respect for private life, including the right to respect for personal information, under 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In addition, especially 
in the last decade, a substantial number of specific legislative provisions were made under 
different Government Bills to enable government departments and other organisations to 
share data for a wide variety of purposes (e.g. the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security 
Bill, the Enterprise Bill, Community Care Bill, Criminal Justice Bill, Children Bill, 
Gambling Bill, Education Bill, Identity Cards Bill, Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Bill, 
Welfare Reform Bill, Offender Management Bill, and the Serious Crime Bill). This 
overview of specific legal provisions led the UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human 
Rights to the observation that “data sharing between public sector bodies is becoming 
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increasingly common… We have repeatedly expressed concerns, from a human rights 
standpoint, about the adequacy of the safeguards accompanying such wide powers to 
share personal information, but these have, for the most part, been rejected by the 
Government” (UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights 2008, p.8). 
 
Others, too, signal increased ways and forms of information sharing between UK 
government departments, such as the growing pressure for the sharing of citizens’ 
personal information among public service agencies as a result of the quest for more 
integrated forms of government (e.g. Bellamy et al. 2005). Crossman observes the 
paradigm shift in information sharing philosophy around 2002, when the Cabinet Office 
Performance and Innovation Unit published a consultation document ‘Privacy and Data-
Sharing: The Way Forward for Public Services’: “The language used was conciliatory; 
throughout the consultation emphasis was placed on the need to balance data sharing 
against privacy concerns. However, the content indicated a subtle shift in philosophy, 
moving away from a presumption that information should not be shared unless there is a 
reason to do so, towards one where information will be shared unless there is a reason to 
do so.” (Crossman 2007, p.175).    
 
In 2006, a Cabinet Committee (‘MISC 31’) was set up to develop the UK government’s 
strategy on data sharing across the public sector. A new high-level outline strategy for 
information sharing was announced in September 2006 and a comprehensive plan for data 
sharing promised for April 2007, but never appeared (Bellamy et al. 2008, p.737). 
Instead, in 2007, the UK Prime Minister commissioned the UK Information 
Commissioner Richard Thomas and Director of the Wellcome Trust Dr Mark Walport to 
conduct an independent review of the framework for the use of personal information in 
the public and private sectors. The terms of reference for this commissioned activity 
required the reviewers to consider whether changes are needed to the operation of the 
Data Protection Act 1998, to provide recommendations on the powers and sanctions 
available to the Information Commission and the courts in the legislation governing data 
sharing and data protection, and to provide recommendations on how data-sharing policy 
should be developed to ensure proper transparency, scrutiny and accountability. 
 
In general, Thomas & Walport point out that it is impossible to take a generic view of data 
sharing: “data sharing in and of itself is neither good nor bad. There are symmetrical 
risks associated with data sharing – in some circumstances it may cause harm to share 
data, but in other circumstances harm may be caused by a failure to share data. Data 
sharing needs to be examined in specific terms. Is the sharing of particular elements of 
personal information for a defined purpose in a precise fashion, likely to bring benefits 
that outweigh significantly any potential harm that might be associated with the sharing?” 
(Thomas & Walport 2008, p.i).  
 
On the basis of their consultation, Thomas & Walport come to the conclusion that “in the 
vast majority of cases, the law itself does not provide a barrier to the sharing of personal 
data…”. However, “the Data Protection Act is still commonly cited as a reason not to 
release information when it may be perfectly legitimate and in the public interest to do 
so…”  As a result, “it is clear that the framework [for the use of personal information in 
the public and private sectors] as it stands is deeply confusing and that many 
practitioners who make decisions on a daily basis about whether or not to share personal 
information do so in a climate of considerable uncertainty” (Thomas & Walport 2008, 
p.1). 
 
Thomas & Walport make several recommendations in their report, including the 
following: 
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 the most important recommendation in their view is to establish a significant 
improvement in the personal and organisational culture of those who collect, 
manage and share personal data. Rigorous training of those responsible and 
accountable for the handling of personal information, backed-up by enhanced 
professional development, accountability, reporting and audit, will effect a major 
improvement in the handling and sharing of personal data; 
 A strong Information Commission with sufficiently robust powers (e.g. stronger 
inspection and audit powers) and sanctions (e.g. financial penalties) available is 
needed to facilitate these cultural improvements; 
 There should be a statutory duty on the Commission to provide a code of practice 
for the sharing of personal information to remove the ‘fog of confusion’ about the 
circumstances in which personal data may be shared; 
 There should be a fast-track legislative framework that will enable transparent 
Parliamentary consideration as to whether any existing statutory bar to the sharing 
of personal information should be removed for particular purposes; and 
 Research and statistical analysis for evidence-based public policy making should be 
enabled in a way that provides the maximum protection to the privacy of 
individuals. 
 
 
The UK government’s response to the report endorsed the reviewers’ key findings and 
recommendations and noted that the appropriate legislative mechanism to authorise or 
require a data sharing arrangement needs to be decided on a case by case basis. The 
response also stated that the UK government is keen to counter the common 
misconception that the Data Protection Act is always a bar to data sharing: “There is an 
appropriate balance that must be struck between the requirement to share data and the 
understanding that failure to share data also carries risks to vulnerable groups and 
individuals. The sharing of personal data between Government departments in a secure 
and appropriate manner is essential to protect the public and to deliver public services. 
The ability of Government to share data performs a crucial role in, among other things, 
protecting children and other vulnerable groups and individuals; it protects individuals 
against crime and disorder; and improves health and education provision. The ability of 
Government to share data between departments is essential in providing and improving 
customer-focused public service delivery and also ensures individuals get the services 
they require.” (Ministry of Justice 2008, p.5). 
 
In several areas, such as the domain of children or identity cards, the UK Government has 
decided to support this required ability of information sharing between government 
departments and other service providers by developing large centralised databases. For 
example, in the area of children, a persistent theme of child abuse inquiries in the UK in 
the last 30 years has been deficiencies in inter-professional communication and multi-
agency intervention (Peckover et al. 2008, p.376). As a result, under the Every Child 
Matters Programme, a national online directory system ‘ContactPoint’ with basic personal 
information on all children in the UK is being set up to improve cross-agency information 
sharing and promote early intervention. Perceived benefits of the system are helping 
practitioners to provide support for children who receive services across, or move across, 
local authority boundaries; quicker assessment of universal services being provided (e.g. 
education, primary health care); and more effective multi-agency working leading to less 
duplication of work and a better service experience for children and young people.  
 
However, early research into the experience of professionals working with the new 
system in different regional areas points out that practitioners are not inclined to work 
with the system, and that the use of this technical solution in professional practice is 
highly contingent upon local policy implementation, the local arrangement of services and 
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the everyday practices of busy and sceptical practitioners (Peckover et al. 2008). The 
researchers also report that the system as currently configured appears to have little in the 
way of panoptic potential, and that the IT infrastructure in many child welfare contexts is 
inadequate to ensure up-to-date records are kept (Peckover et al. 2008, p.391).  
  
Furthermore, based on a recent research effort to map and assess forty-six large 
centralised databases used across UK government departments, Anderson et al. (2009) 
conclude that a quarter of the reviewed databases are almost certainly illegal under human 
rights or UK Data Protection law. Moreover, more than half of the reviewed databases 
have significant problems with privacy or effectiveness and could fall foul of a legal 
challenge. In summary, fewer than 15 per cent of the assessed public databases are 
perceived to be effective, proportionate and necessary, with a proper legal basis for any 
privacy intrusions (Anderson et al. 2009, p.4). 
 
In general in the UK, there appear to be two seemingly opposed, emerging perspectives 
on the use of ICTs for cross-agency information sharing purposes, and their implications: 
one perspective points to the development of a ‘Surveillance State’, whereas another 
perspective focuses on the emergence of a more effective ‘Service State’ (Lips et al. 
2009). As an example of the latter perspective, several UK policy developments point at 
the importance of technology enabled ‘service transformation’. The UK Central 
Government Policy Strategy ‘Transformational Government – Enabled by Technology’ 
(2005) for instance presents an agenda of key public sector transformations in which 
information sharing will play a major role, including citizen-centric public service design 
and an increased uptake of shared services to release efficiencies.  
 
A further example is a 2006 government report on Service Transformation presented by 
Sir David Varney, who points at the opportunity of using a cross-government IDM system 
for achieving effective public service transformation (Varney 2006). In presenting the 
now infamous Whitehall example of how a bereaved UK citizen needs to address 
government service counters about forty four different times, Varney makes a clear case 
for further examining the scope for coordinating and integrating front-line service 
delivery to citizens and reducing the duplication of business processes in government, 
through cross-government information sharing (Varney 2006). Moreover, following up 
Sir David Varney’s report on service transformation, a current UK initiative is the ‘Tell us 
Once’ pilot project, led by the UK Department of Work and Pensions and involving a 
broad cross-government partnership including HM Revenue and Customs, local 
authorities, the Driving and Vehicle Licensing Agency and the Identity and Passport 
Service. As a result of this initiative, in future citizens only have to tell government once 
when registering a birth, death or a change of address. Current trials in place at 15 local 
authorities offer citizens the option to have a face-to-face interview, telephone service or 
web-based service, to allow them to notify government only once of a death, or to report 
the death to government in the normal way.  
 
An example of the first mentioned perspective of the UK becoming a ‘Surveillance State’ 
as a result of using ICTs for improving cross-government coordination and information 
sharing, is a June 2008 Speech on Security and Liberty by the UK Prime Minister, in 
which he emphasised the need to preserve individual liberties when introducing new ICT-
enabled measures to fight crime and terrorism, such as those relating to identity cards, the 
National DNA Database, and CCTV. Furthermore, in May 2008, the House of Commons’ 
Home Affairs Committee called on the UK Government to give proper consideration to 
the risks associated with increasing and excessive ICT-enabled ‘surveillance’, i.e. the 
collection and processing of citizens’ personal data, as the resulting loss of privacy erodes 
trust between the individual and the Government and can change the nature of the 
relationship between citizen and state (House of Commons 2008).  
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More recently, in 2009, based on an inquiry into the impact that government surveillance 
has upon the privacy of citizens and their relationship with the state, the House of Lords’ 
Select Committee on the Constitution similarly concluded that there has been a profound 
and continuous expansion in the surveillance apparatus of the state (House of Lords 
2009). Examples mentioned were the growing use of CCTV cameras in public places, 
increased reliance on the interception of communications by the police and security 
services, and a national scheme of identity cards. In the view of the House of Lords’ 
Select Committee, to respond to crime, combat the threat of terrorism, and improve 
administrative efficiency, the development of ICT-enabled surveillance and the collection 
and processing of personal information have become pervasive, routine and almost taken 
for granted in British society, with data being collected on the entire population and not 
just on traditional “suspects” (House of Lords 2009).  
 
The House of Lords’ Select Committee on the Constitution did acknowledge that the 
processing of personal data has always been part of public administration, and that it is 
essential to effective governance and efficient service delivery. However, they perceived a 
distinction of contemporary uses of surveillance and data processing from those of the 
past in the extent and intensity with which information is analysed, collated, and used. 
Regarding privacy and the principle of restraint in the use of surveillance and data 
collection powers as central to individual freedom, the Select Committee observed a 
serious threat to these principles as a result of the growing use of surveillance by 
government (House of Lords 2009, p.9-10). Recommendations made by the House of 
Lords’ Select Committee on the Constitution included the adoption of a principle of data 
minimisation by government departments; broadening and strengthening the powers of 
the UK Information Commissioner; enhanced information security; citizen-centred IDM 
solutions; and training and raising awareness about the legal meanings of necessity and 
proportionality in the collection and processing of citizens’ personal information. 
 
During the time that the UK government sought to further increase ICT-enabled cross-
agency information sharing, the UK public sector experienced a number of high-profile 
‘Data Loss Incidents’ (DLIs). Since 2007, DLIs include the loss or theft of a substantial 
number of memory sticks across government and private sector (sub-)contractors of 
government, with several sticks holding sensitive data, such as medical information of 
more than 6,000 prisoners and ex-prisoners; information on all 84,000 prisoners in 
England and Wales; and personal details of about 10,000 prolific offenders; DLIs also 
involve the loss or theft of computer and portable hard drives containing for instance 
personal details of about 600,000 people who had expressed an interest in the Royal 
Navy, Royal Marines and the RAF (including bank details and National Insurance 
numbers);  personal details of about 3 million candidates for the UK driving theory test in 
the USA; and the loss of computer discs containing personal details of about 25 million 
child benefit recipients (including bank details and National Insurance Numbers). These 
DLIs have contributed to a public perception of “institutionalised incompetence” of 
government agencies to appropriately manage (sensitive) personal data on the citizen 
(BBC News 2008). 
 
 
Canada 
Canadian Federal Government 
There is no federal government strategy dedicated to cross-government information 
sharing in Canada. Moreover, there is no specific provision in the Canadian Federal 
Privacy Act 1982 relating to data sharing. However, section 8 (2)(m) of the Canadian 
Privacy Act 1982 permits government institutions to disclose personal information, 
without the consent of the individual concerned, for any purpose where, in the opinion of 
the head of the institution, the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion 
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of privacy that could result from the disclosure, or disclosure would clearly benefit the 
individual to whom the information relates.  
 
From a cross-government information sharing perspective, the Canadian legislative 
framework currently has four general restrictions with regard to the collection, use and 
disclosure of personal information between agencies (Trudel et al. 2007, p.2). Firstly, 
under current Canadian privacy legislation, the collection of personal information would 
involve a government agency requiring or requesting individuals to identify themselves 
via the use of an identifier. In order for the agency to “collect” the identifier, it must either 
be previously authorized by a statute to collect the personal information concerned or the 
collection must be reasonably necessary for the carrying out of a lawful activity 
performed by that agency. A second restriction with regard to the collection of personal 
information is that the information should be direct, i.e. obtained from the person to 
whom the information relates. Thirdly, the use of personal information is restricted to the 
purpose for which that information has been collected. And fourthly, a public body may 
not, as a general rule, communicate personal information that is in its possession to a third 
party. However, the release of personal information is permitted if expressly authorized 
by law. This exchange of information may be formalized in an information sharing 
agreement.  
 
In general, solutions for improving cross-government information sharing appear to be 
sought in the establishment of Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) and information 
sharing protocols between agencies concerned. Clear rules regarding information sharing 
between various jurisdictions are expected to promote cross-government information 
sharing, improve the coordination between various levels of government, and increase 
transparency (Lacroix et al. 2004). Furthermore, in areas of individuals and families at 
risk, several provincial governments in Canada have identified the need for greater cross-
government coordination and information sharing and put information sharing protocols 
in place (e.g. Novia Scotia’s ‘High Risk Case Coordination Protocol Framework. 
Spousal/Intimate Partner Violence’, Manitoba’s Information Sharing Protocol under the 
Youth Criminal Justice Act). 
 
 
Province of British Columbia 
In British Columbia, there has been significant pressure in recent years to increase the 
amount of data sharing between government agencies. Traditionally, government 
programme implementation and service delivery has been the responsibility of each 
individual agency. It is acknowledged that a cohesive flow of information between 
agencies can reduce the duplication of services, and limit inappropriate intervention or 
lack of action when action is necessary. For example, in the Canadian health sector, there 
is crossover between the Federal government (Health Infoway), the Ministry of Health 
(Medical Service Plan, Master Patient Index), Health Authorities, community intervention 
projects, private labs and private physicians (Office of the Government CIO 2008, p.2).  
 
Improved information sharing therefore requires coordination and collaboration between 
multiple levels of government and the private sector, and would bring about the delivery 
of timely and effective services to the public, streamline service provision and achieve the 
goal of better outcomes for citizens. Available technology has been acknowledged as an 
enabler for establishing this new model of ‘Citizen Centered services’ and, with that, as an 
important means to communicate for the purposes of information sharing.  
 
In British Columbia, the Office of the Government Chief Information Officer is 
responsible for provincial legislation in the domain of privacy and the protection of 
personal information. While acknowledging increasing privacy-related risks in widening 
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the basis for the sharing of personal information, the provincial government is developing 
initiatives to improve public service delivery and efficiencies through more widespread 
disclosure of citizens’ personal information across agencies. The Office of the 
Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia is actively monitoring and 
providing comment to these initiatives to ensure that they comply with the existing 
privacy law and meet reasonable privacy expectations (OIPC for BC 2009, p.8).  
 
One of the initiatives taken in British Columbia is the development of a provincial identity 
management (IDM) framework. This initiative aims to meet the need to share information 
in three particular ways (Watkins 2007 p.3):  
 
1. Information sharing for research purposes. British Columbia recognises that 
solutions to its most complex social issues will not be found within one organisation 
or sector. Education, for example, has profound impacts on health and social welfare. 
Researchers and policy makers must therefore have access to information across 
sectors both to develop and evaluate public policy. 
 
2. Information sharing for frontline service providers, in particular the need to share 
information across health, social, education and criminal/justice sectors. Homeless 
citizens, as an example, frequently face a myriad of concerns beyond a lack of 
housing (e.g. addictions, mental and physical health challenges, unemployment, and 
poverty). What is becoming increasingly clear is that an uncoordinated approach 
across sectors makes the task of improving citizen outcomes extremely difficult. 
 
3. Information sharing for citizen self-service. In British Columbia, citizens are 
increasingly using online services to conduct business and organise their lives. To 
establish a truly citizen-centric government, the Province of British Columbia needs 
to establish IDM and security protections that will enable greater online service. 
 
The challenge perceived here is being able to coordinate activity and share information 
appropriately across agencies. Reorganisation so as to consolidate organisations that must 
work together to improve outcomes, was not perceived as a suitable answer, as any given 
organisation contributes to outcomes from widely spaced public service domains. 
Moreover, consolidation in order to establish political and management authority within a 
single organisational context with the aim to overcome barriers to information sharing, 
could lead to an unacceptable consolidation of power. As a result, the solution has been to 
develop an IDM system which supports cross-government information sharing and 
enhances privacy protection at the same time. The developed IDM solution includes a 
claims-based, user-centric architecture.   
 
As indicated earlier, in Canada, an important barrier to improving information sharing 
across agencies is perceived to be in current legislation in the area of personal information 
protection. For instance, in British Columbia, the following lessons were learned from a 
policy analysis of legal barriers and enablers of information sharing across government, 
based on a comparative analysis of the three provincial Acts regulating the collection, use 
and disclosure of personal information by, and between parties (i.e. FOIPPA, PIPA and 
PIPEDA) (Office of the Government CIO 2008, p.10): 
 
 Information sharing is limited, but not impossible. The three Acts set out very 
specific circumstances when personal information may be collected, used and 
disclosed. Health care, legal matters, law enforcement, and debt collection are 
common themes across the Acts through which certain information sharing 
options are available. 
 The ability to share information depends upon who is sharing the information, 
and how. The ability to collect and/or disclose information between two or more 
75  
 Private organizations have much more stringent provisions protecting the 
collection, use and disclosure of personal information. PIPA and PIPEDA are 
based on consent. They are more restrictive with respect to the collection, use and 
disclosure of personal information without consent. FOIPPA provides more 
flexibility comparatively with respect to the disclosure of personal information. 
 PIPEDA limits personal information flow more than PIPA. PIPA includes a 
provision that allows for implicit consent, providing increased flexibility over 
PIPEDA with respect to information sharing in certain circumstances. 
 
Furthermore, officials from British Columbia acknowledge that implementing complex 
information sharing agreements across several parties is difficult, especially when the 
parties are located in both the private and public sectors. This complexity often requires 
that needs for information sharing are examined on a case by case basis. 
 
 
Australia 
The Australian Federal Government 
The Australian Federal Privacy Act, 1988, does not contain a specific provision for 
information sharing between public sector agencies. In general, the Information Privacy 
Principles, and exceptions to these principles, determine whether or not agencies can 
share information. Furthermore, the Act empowers the Federal Privacy Commissioner to 
make Public Interest Determinations (PIDs). A PID is a determination on the basis of 
public interest that an act or practice of an agency, which would otherwise breach an 
Information Privacy Principle or an existing privacy code, is to be regarded as not 
breaching the principle or code concerned.  
 
Commissioned by the Council of Australian Government’s (COAG) Online and 
Communication Council in July 2007, the Australian Federal Government recently 
adopted a National Government Information Sharing Strategy (NGISS). Aim of the 
NGISS is to provide (Commonwealth of Australia 2008a, p.5): “a standardised approach 
to information sharing to support the delivery of government services to the Australian 
community. The expectation is that the national strategy can be used by all portfolio areas 
at all levels of government”. Research conducted for the development of the NGISS 
identified the following structural barriers to successful information sharing across 
agencies (Commonwealth of Australia 2008a, p.10-11): 
 
1. Leadership at political and senior executive levels: competing agenda and 
differing goals across, and within, the three tiers of government make it difficult to 
gain cohesive support for information sharing from public sector leaders. In many 
cases, executives focus on protecting agency information as a priority and are not 
aware of the benefits of sharing this information with other agencies and levels of 
government where it is legitimate to do so. 
2. The absence of clear value proposition: the usefulness of information gathered by 
one agency to another part of the same agency, or other agencies or jurisdictions, is 
not recognised; excessive cost-recovery policies can inhibit re-use of information; 
or information and its associated intellectual property is undervalued and shared too 
freely. 
3. The absence of a common approach to information management practices:  
this leads to difficulties in several areas of information sharing, such as the 
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4. Complex privacy legislation and related accountability issues: The complexity 
of Australian privacy laws which, according to the Australian Law Reform 
Commission, are multi-layered, fragmented and inconsistent, often results in the 
default response to requests for information (that might be considered sensitive) as: 
“We cannot share our information because of privacy laws.” This response is often 
given instead of determining (through the appropriate channels) whether the 
information can, in fact, be shared. 
5. Non-Sharing Culture: research findings demonstrate that there is still a culture of 
‘information is power’ that results in the defensive protection of an organisation’s 
information assets. Added to this is the fact that knowledge management practices 
are poorly defined and applied. There is also a generational divide in terms of 
attitudes towards information sharing. Younger generations have grown up in a 
world where the information they need is readily available and easily shared, 
whereas, older generations have generally not experienced or adopted such sharing 
approaches. 
 
 
The following NGISS Information Sharing Principles were identified as essential for 
successful information sharing: 
• Provide leadership; 
• Demonstrate value: move from ‘need to know’ to ‘need to share’; 
• Act collaboratively; 
• Establish clear governance; 
• Establish custodianship guidelines; 
• Build for interoperability; 
• Use standards-based information; 
• Promote information re-use; 
• Ensure privacy and security 
 
The NGISS is to be followed by an implementation plan to identify and report on progress 
across all jurisdictions. Implementation strategies are grouped under four areas: awareness 
raising; improving governance; management and planning; and enabling tools. 
 
Similar research findings to those from the NGISS development study mentioned above 
can be found in specific domains focused at individuals and families at risk. An example 
is a recent study conducted to assess what the Australian federal government can do to 
improve the effectiveness of information sharing for families and children in the child 
protection system (Commonwealth of Australia 2008b). In general, the research findings 
demonstrate that information sharing can and does occur under current legislation. 
However, there is a low level of understanding of what information can be requested and 
how to manage information requests.  
 
The following key barriers to effective information sharing were identified:  
 
• Provisions in legislation for the sharing of information: while there are legal 
avenues available for information sharing, requesting agencies report that legal 
obligations are often given as a reason why information cannot be disclosed; 
• The lack of agreed processes: child protection agencies are not typically aware of 
what sort of information other agencies hold; there is no national standard process for 
requesting information; and there are inconsistent views around the application of 
legal thresholds; 
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• Risk aversion in organisations: stakeholders report risk aversion on the part of both 
requesting and responding, likely as a result of the two barriers above 
 
The following suggestions for improvements were made, without undertaking legislative 
change: 
 
• Facilitating and expanding the Commonwealth’s role in information sharing: agree a 
protocol for information sharing between agencies concerned so to establish clear 
processes for information sharing; 
• Improve understanding and consistent application of legal thresholds for information 
disclosure: as part of developing the information sharing protocol, Centrelink should 
review its guidelines for information sharing and organise the training of staff to 
ensure there is a good understanding and consistent implementation of guidelines 
• Include Centrelink in the interstate alerts system; 
• Consider the appropriateness of thresholds for disclosure in review of secrecy 
provisions; and 
• Explore further opportunities for information sharing with other parties, including 
Medicare Australia, Family Court, Department of Immigration and Citizenship. 
7 Improving information sharing for effective social 
 outcomes: solutions and recommendations 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Based on the case study findings, the review of international information sharing 
solutions, the discussion of the case study findings in focus group meetings and feedback 
sessions, and solutions suggested in the focus group meetings and feedback sessions, the 
following solutions and recommendations for improving cross-government information 
sharing in the New Zealand context have been developed. With that, we provide an 
answer to the research question of how, and under what conditions, cross-government 
information sharing can be improved in order to achieve more effective social outcomes. 
 
 
Solutions and recommendations for improving information sharing 
The empirical findings from this research show that officials are conscious about the need 
to protect the personal information of clients and are acting upon this need: for instance, 
they share information on a ‘need to know’ basis, and use signed consent forms as 
authorisation to share information with other agencies. Privacy values are embedded in 
the way that officials work and, with that, these values shape operational information 
sharing practice. Furthermore, in situations where there are professional, personal and/or 
community safety risks related to the confidentiality of personal information on the client, 
staff members of agencies operating under a public safety mandate can rely on Principle 
11 of the Privacy Act, 1993, to share critical information with other professionals. 
Generally therefore, and in line with operational practice, existing privacy legislation 
appears to offer an appropriate ‘default position’ for government agencies to share 
information, and to provide enough room for information sharing arrangements. 
 
However, we observed clear differences in information sharing procedure and practice 
between agencies operating under a public safety mandate, and agencies with a public 
service mandate. Although agencies operating under a public service mandate experience 
similar safety risks related to the confidentiality of an individual’s personal data 
compared to agencies operating under a public safety mandate, public service 
organisations do not have a legal ‘back-up’ when they share critical information with 
other professionals. Moreover, not having a legal provision for sharing critical 
information on individuals at risk, leads to ambiguous situations around legal boundaries 
of information sharing in dealing with other agencies (public service providers, agencies 
with a public safety mandate, and community service providers). As a result, 
professionals experience uncertainty about whether, and if so what information can be 
shared, and therefore often decide not to share critical information.  
 
This default position of not sharing information leads to situations in which the complex 
needs of the client are not being met; professionals being exposed to danger without their 
knowledge; and clients at risk needing to join-up agencies themselves in order to 
consume the required integrated services. This default position also stands in the way of 
sharing information with public service providers in the health domain and/or with health 
practitioners, which is often required to do a professional job towards individuals or 
families at risk. 
 
For these reasons we conclude that there is a clear need for legal support of information 
sharing in the area of providing social services, similar to the working of Principle 11 
under the Privacy Act, 1993. A legal precedent for sharing critical information under 
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privacy legislation in line with Principle 11 under the New Zealand Privacy Act, 1993, 
can be found in the Information Privacy Bill, 2007, of Western Australia, where the 
following legal provision exists: a “disclosure to lessen or prevent a serious threat to an 
individual’s or public welfare”. 
 
 
Solution 1: Under the current privacy legislation, create a Code of Practice for 
Welfare  
As information sharing is strongly related to trust in relationships with other 
professionals, and information sharing protocols focused on a clear commitment to a 
shared outcome are useful for developing relationships with other agencies, building trust 
amongst professionals, and providing clarity about the application of legal provisions, we 
propose to use information sharing protocols to improve information sharing across 
agencies. A good example of an information sharing protocol developed in conjunction 
with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner is the information sharing protocol used 
under the Priority Offenders Initiative. Besides a regular evaluation of the functioning of 
an information sharing protocol by Head Office, a local team evaluation could help 
identifying practical barriers to information sharing at an early stage (e.g. high case 
volumes; particular agencies needed at the table; personality problems within the team).    
 
 
Solution 2:  Use Information Sharing Protocols focused on a clear commitment to a 
shared outcome to build professional trust and relationships across 
agencies 
 
 
Recommendation 1: Organise a local team evaluation of the functioning of the  
   information sharing protocol arrangement on a regular basis 
We observed that professionals are most exposed in obtaining critical medical information 
on individual clients, and that health information is the area in which safety issues are 
most likely to arise. Moreover, not sharing health-related information between 
professionals can compromise clients from receiving services they are entitled to. 
However, professionals usually are not inclined to share health-related information.  
 
 
Solution 3:  In designing Information Sharing Protocols, pay special attention to 
the interface with health information 
We propose that NGOs be included in future information sharing protocols to overcome 
current ‘grey areas’ around information sharing procedure and practice between 
government agencies and community-based service providers. 
 
 
Solution 4:  Include NGOs in information sharing protocols 
We observed the importance of trust as a precondition for effective information sharing 
and concluded that the quality of information sharing depends on the quality of 
relationships between individual professionals. Moreover, where there is a culture of 
working together for shared outcomes there is more co-operation and less ambiguity about 
information sharing. Based on these research findings we conclude the critical importance 
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for an agency to select a representative with the right relationship and trust building 
qualities for participation in a cross-government initiative, in order to enable effective 
information sharing. Consequently, agencies will need to look for candidates with the 
right qualities for successful cross-government collaboration. In earlier research, we made 
some specific recommendations in that respect (see the research findings of the EIP JUG 
project).  
 
 
Solution 5:  Selection of the right agency representative for participation in a cross-
government initiative is critical for enabling effective information 
sharing  
With the observation that the quality of information sharing depends on the quality of 
relationships between individual professionals, the facilitating role of the Chair person in 
cross-government initiatives becomes of importance. In order to bring the right set of 
agencies to the table (in terms of both sector representation and volumes), to facilitate 
agreement between professionals on the shared outcome of information sharing, and to 
enable the development of relationships and trust between professionals, agencies also 
will need to look for suitable candidates who can effectively act as the primus inter pares 
and provide facilitative leadership to the group of professionals. Facilitative leadership 
could further include acting as the ‘lead’ agency with respect to information management, 
such as dealing with issues around ownership of shared information or providing technical 
support for managing the process (e.g. offering access to a secure shared workspace). 
 
 
Solution 6: Arrange for facilitative leadership in a (horizontal) information sharing 
arrangement 
Co-location of organisations (government and non-government) that provide services to 
the same target group of individuals and families with complex needs enhances 
opportunities to develop relationships with other agencies, build trust among professionals 
and, with that, support information sharing practice. However, issues around the 
management of shared records and ownership of information (e.g. which agency deals 
with an OIA request?) need to be taken into account when exploring or implementing a 
co-location solution. 
 
 
Solution 7: Explore co-location opportunities for service providing partner 
organisations 
In several cases (e.g. HR/HP forums), more routine information sharing practices lead to 
rapidly increasing case volumes. This situation can get unmanageable and will require a 
redesign of the information sharing process. For example, in the case of HR/HP, the 
current information sharing process could be split up in an eight months preparation 
meeting of frontline operators and a four months meeting in which senior management 
signs off cases. 
 
 
Solution 8: When information sharing is routine and case volumes are rapidly 
increasing the information sharing process needs to be subject to 
reconsideration 
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Officials constantly make judgments about the validity of information, whether they can 
use that information officially or if they can act on it unofficially, and what information 
can be shared with whom and for what purpose. Although public sector staff receive 
regular training on the application of the Privacy Act, 1993, they often lack information 
on the ways and extent to which they can share information on the client with other 
professionals. NGOs usually do not have the financial resources to offer their staff 
training related to the Privacy Act. In addition, an area which has not been further 
explored by most agencies so far (a good exception is the Priority Offenders Initiative), is 
the systematic application of de-personalised ways of information sharing on the client. 
These alternative ways of information sharing support an individual’s privacy protection 
and enhance information security. 
 
 
 
Solution 9: Provide training and education on the do’s and don’ts of information 
sharing under privacy legislation, across the public sector and NGOs 
 
 
Recommendation 2: Lower the fees for privacy legislation training and education to 
NGOs 
 
 
Recommendation 3: Further explore de-personalised ways of sharing information  
Frontline staff members involved in horizontal information sharing initiatives experience 
a lack of clarity about the correct interpretation of the Privacy Act, 1993, due to the fact 
that different government agencies have different interpretations of the Act, and how it 
should be applied. 
 
 
Solution 10: Head offices of agencies involved in an information sharing 
arrangement need to provide explicit, joint guidance on (the 
implementation of) a uniform interpretation of the Privacy Act, 1993  
 
 
 
Vertical information sharing practices between Head Office, local management structures 
and frontline operators demonstrate weaknesses, such as information gaps and different 
perceptions about what the initiative is trying to achieve, which could be managed. 
 
 
Solution 11:  There needs to be more attention for increasing the effectiveness of 
vertical information sharing between Head Office, local management 
and front-line operators, including an understanding of different 
information needs at the various levels 
 
 
 
In many cases, technical solutions for improved information sharing are available, but 
unused. Furthermore, NGOs have no substantive investment in technical capability, or the 
means to improve that investment. By making use of available technical solutions and 
investing in technical capability as well as technical literacy, across the public sector and 
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NGOs, information security and the protection of personal information in cross-agency 
information sharing initiatives can be improved substantially.  
 
 
Solution 12: Provide representatives of participating government agencies and 
NGOs with access rights to a secure information system. 
 
 
Solution 13:  Use shared secure workspaces across information sharing collaborators 
including NGOs 
 
 
Solution 14: Further invest in technical capability as well as technical literacy, 
across the public sector and NGOs 
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Appendix 1: Assessment of case studies against selection criteria. 
 
(1) Multicultural Service Centre for Refugees 
With respect to the selection criteria for the study, the organisations work with vulnerable 
individuals and families dealing with complex problems at the intersection of multiple policy 
domains (e.g. social, economic and justice; social, education and health). They collectively 
provide a range of services to the same group of people, but are not necessarily privy to the 
information provided to the others, depending on its nature. 
 
Services to refugees are provided by a range of government and non-government organisations 
and therefore multi-agency co-ordination and co-operation is critical to maintaining service 
quality. A collective, inter-sector action plan was developed in 2005/6 with different agencies 
taking a lead role in addressing key issues. The following table summarises the match between the 
criteria for selection and this case study: 
 
 
Programme Indiv/ 
FAR 
Complex 
Problems 
Govt/Non-
govt 
Ethnic var Vol/Comp Information 
Sensitivity 
Tech 
Multicul-
tural  
Service 
Centre 
Indivs 
and 
families 
at risk 
Housing; 
Health; 
Education; 
Employ-
ment; 
Language; 
Mental 
Health; 
Resettle-
ment needs 
Non-Govt People from 
a wide 
variety of 
nations 
Voluntary 
participati
on by 
clients 
Personal; 
Health; 
Family 
matters 
Low 
 
 
(2) Linwood Service Centre 
The Linwood Service Centre delivers services to individuals seeking income, housing, 
employment and other types of welfare assistance.  Their needs are often complex and relate to a 
variety of policy domains (e.g. social, economic and justice; social, education and health).  The 
agencies participating in the Service Centre provide a range of services based on entitlement and 
advocacy. Some sets of information on individuals are shared, depending on the service being 
provided. 
 
The following table summarises the match between the criteria for selection and this case study: 
 
 
Prog Indiv/ 
FAR 
Complex 
Problems 
Govt/Non-
govt 
Ethnic va Vol/Comp Information  
Sensitivity 
Tech 
Integrated 
Service 
Response 
(Linwood 
Service 
Centre, 
Christchurch) 
 
Indivs  Income 
support;  
Employment; 
Housing;  
Welfare. 
Mix Pan-
ethnic 
Vol Personal; 
Health; 
Family 
matters 
Med 
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(3) High Risk/ High Profile Forums 
The HR/HP forums offer an alternative model of information sharing. Individuals discussed in this 
forum are unaware it operates and have no choice in the process.  It is a management process 
designed to maximise communication between various parties responsible and accountable for the 
effective management of a common set of individuals. The needs of the individuals are often 
complex and require co-ordination across diverse interests. Community safety and security can be 
affected negatively when communications and co-ordination are not managed appropriately.   
 
This initiative is primarily an internal communications alignment process. External agencies 
(Police) are involved on the basis of ensuring community safety is enhanced. Other external 
agencies are involved in managing release arrangements (e.g. housing, treatment facilities) but are 
not included in the forum. 
 
The following table summarises the match between the research criteria for selection and this case 
study: 
 
 
Prog Indiv/ 
FAR 
Complex 
Problems 
Govt/Non-
govt 
Ethnic var Vol/Comp Information 
Sensitivity 
Tech 
HR/HP 
 
Indivs  Offending 
history; 
income; 
employment; 
housing; 
mental 
health; 
complex 
family 
interactions. 
Govt Pan-ethnic Comp Personal; 
Health; 
Mental 
health; 
Family 
matters; 
offending 
history 
High 
 
 
(4) Priority Offenders Initiative 
In contrast to the HR/HP forum model, after initial identification of potential participants, this 
initiative is completely voluntary on the part of the targeted individual, and their family/ whanau.   
Participants usually have complex needs and the information sharing requirements include 
sensitive and personal information.  All information sharing is done with the informed consent of 
the participant.  Close co-ordination of multiple agencies, both government and non-government, 
is required.  
 
The following table summarises the match between the research criteria for selection and this case 
study: 
 
 
Prog Indiv/ 
FAR 
Complex 
Problems 
Govt/Non-
govt 
Ethnic var Vol/Comp Information  
Sensitivity 
Tech 
POI 
 
Indivs 
and their 
families  
Offending 
history; 
income; 
employment; 
housing; 
mental health; 
complex 
family 
interactions. 
Govt Maori Vol Personal; 
Health; 
Mental health;
Family 
matters; 
offending 
history 
Low 
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(5) Electronic Monitored Bail (EM Bail) 
EM Bail is applied for by remand prisoners wishing to spend their pre-trial period at home with 
electronic monitoring.  Authorisation is given to NZ Police to carry out comprehensive checks on 
the individual to ascertain their suitability for the programme.  Police act as the single point of 
assessment, but share and obtain information on the individual from a broad range of agencies and 
individuals within the community (e.g. employers, family members).   
 
The following table summarises the match between the research criteria for selection and this case 
study: 
 
 
Prog Indiv/ 
FAR 
Complex 
Problems 
Govt/Non-
govt 
Ethnic var Vol/Comp Information 
Sensitivity 
Tech 
EM Bail 
 
Indivs  Offending 
history; 
income; 
employment; 
housing; 
mental 
health; 
complex 
family 
interactions. 
Govt Pan-ethnic Vol Personal; 
Health; 
Mental 
health; 
Family 
matters; 
offending 
history 
Med 
 
